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GRASPING FOR ENERGY DEMOCRACY
Shelley Welton*
Until recently, energy law has attracted relatively little citizen participation.
Instead, Americans have preferred to leave matters of energy governance to
expert bureaucrats. But the imperative to respond to climate change presents
energy regulators with difficult choices over what our future energy sources
should be, and how quickly we should transition to them—choices that are
outside traditional regulatory expertise. For example, there are currently ro-
bust nationwide debates over what role new nuclear power plants and hydrau-
lically fractured natural gas should play in our energy mix, and over how to
maintain affordable energy for all while rewarding those who choose to put
solar panels on their roofs. These questions are far less technical and more
value laden than most of the questions energy bureaucrats faced in the past.
Consequently, these issues have provoked a growing call for the “democratiza-
tion” of energy law, so that the field might better inject Americans’ preferences
and goals into decisions over energy policy.
But exactly how the democratization of energy law might proceed remains
unclear. Indeed, the concept of “energy democracy” has taken on significantly
different—and frequently conflicting—meanings in debates over energy law
reform. This Article argues that the lack of clarity over the meaning of energy
democracy presents a troubling hurdle to the burgeoning project of democra-
tizing energy law, as different conceptions of the term demand divergent legal
reforms. To make this case, it first identifies three distinct conceptions of en-
ergy democracy in discussions of energy law reform: consumer choice, local
control, and access to process. It then explains how each of these visions coun-
sels for a different set of regulatory reforms, which instantiate distinct
processes for channeling citizen preferences about the future of our energy sys-
tem. As regulators choose among these visions, it is imperative that they un-
derstand the stakes of embracing any particular conception of “energy
democracy.” This Article advances that endeavor by tying the rhetoric of en-
ergy democracy to concrete proposals for reform, and evaluating what each
portends for the “democratization” of energy law. It concludes with a note of
caution about too swiftly embracing “consumer choice” or “local control,”
since each risks narrowing modes of participation in ways that may diminish
from a robust conversation about the grid-wide changes needed in U.S. energy
supply.
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Thanks to Holly
Doremus, Sean Kammer, Amanda Shanor, Doug Kysar, Al Klevorick, Susan Rose-Ackerman,
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and participants in the University of Washington School of Law’s June 2016 Junior
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Workshop at UNC-Chapel Hill, the Yale Law School Ph.D. in Law Workshop, UC-Berkeley’s
Spring 2017 Environmental Law Colloquium, and Sharon Jacobs’s Spring 2017 Advanced
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Introduction
Americans have long treated energy law as predominantly an exercise in
expert technological management, requiring limited citizen participation.1
We all want light upon the flick of a switch, and we revile the notion of
waiting in line to fill our gas tanks, but rarely have we been interested in
peering behind the curtain of energy regulation.2 It doesn’t help that energy
regulators implement their mandates to ensure reliability and maintain “just
1. See Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restruc-
turing in the American Electric Utility System 1–2, 9 (1999) (describing the twentieth-
century “consensus” between regulated utilities and public utility commissions).
2. See Michael J. Graetz, The End of Energy: The Unmaking of America’s Envi-
ronment, Security, and Independence 1 (2011); see also Am. Acad. of Arts & Scis., Be-
yond Technology: Strengthening Energy Policy Through Social Science 8 (2011),
https://www.amacad.org/pdfs/alternativeenergy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6AJ-Z7X4] (“One of
the great triumphs of modern society is that we’ve hidden the infrastructure. Nobody really
understands where electricity, gas, or water come from.”).
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and reasonable rates” primarily through complex adjudicatory proceedings,3
which discourage broad participation.4
Yet climate change obliterates the idea that energy law can continue to
be—if it ever was—a value-neutral exercise best left to utilities and their
regulatory oversight bodies. To effectively respond to climate change, the
U.S. energy system requires a radical transformation—often called “decar-
bonization”—from predominantly fossil-fuel-fired energy to almost exclu-
sively carbon-free energy sources.5 In the face of this challenging task and
the many policy conundrums it raises, few Americans express continued de-
sire to punt energy policy to bureaucratic experts.6
Instead, “[p]eople are starting to recognize that the world of energy in-
volves fundamental ethical questions.”7 This growing recognition is evident
in recent protest movements—and violent reprisals—over new oil and gas
pipelines,8 in strangely cross-partisan state battles over solar energy policy,9
and in hard-fought state ballot initiatives considering whether to adopt car-
bon taxes.10 Despite such visible outcries from the public on energy policy,
much of our decisionmaking on energy policy in the United States occurs
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Section I.C.
6. See Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 Emory L.J. 695,
697–98 (2016) (describing the many political battles that energy raises).
7. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Michael H. Dworkin, Global Energy Justice:
Problems, Principles, and Practices 1 (2014).
8. See Gregor Aisch & K.K. Rebecca Lai, The Conflicts Along 1,172 Miles of the Dakota
Access Pipeline, N.Y. Times (Nov. 23, 2016) (updated Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/11/23/us/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-map.html  (on file with the Michigan
Law Review); Juliet Eilperin, The Keystone XL Pipeline and Its Politics, Explained, Wash. Post
(Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/03/the-keystone-xl-
pipeline-and-its-politics-explained/?utm_term=.3cb0d32cdfca [https://perma.cc/7CLX-
QQM4].
9. See Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 571, 592–94 (2017)
(documenting the proliferation of state debates over solar policy); Stephen Lacey, Why More
Tea Partyers Are Rallying Behind Solar, Greentech Media (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.green
techmedia.com/articles/read/why-more-conservatives-and-libertarians-are-getting-behind-so-
lar [https://perma.cc/Q57J-C8QU]; Taylor Link, Florida Voters Reject Misleading Referendum
that Sought to Tax Solar Energy, Salon (Nov. 9 2016, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/
11/09/florida-voters-reject-misleading-referendum-that-sought-to-tax-solar-energy/ [https://
perma.cc/GYY3-JUQG]; John Schwartz, Measure in Florida that Claims to Back Solar Power
May Discourage It, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/science/
florida-solar-power-referendum.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Tell Util. So-
lar Won’t Be Killed, http://dontkillsolar.com/tusk/ [https://perma.cc/QMC8-JKE3] (Repub-
licans for solar website).
10. See Chelsea Harvey, The Battle over Washington State’s Proposed Carbon Tax Has Got-
ten Even Weirder, Wash. Post (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/11/07/the-bizarre-political-fight-over-washington-states-ballot-mea
sure-to-tax-carbon/?utm_term=.7acdfaaf4900 [https://perma.cc/7EAS-JEXA]; Lewis Kamb,
Washington Voters Reject Initiative to Impose Carbon Tax on Fossil Fuels, Seattle Times (Nov.
8, 2016, 9:00 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/carbon-emissions-tax-ini
tiative-732/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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within complex layers of bureaucracy.11 Today’s energy bureaucrats must de-
termine what the fate of aging nuclear power and coal plants should be;12
how much renewable energy to incentivize, and who should pay for it;13 how
to protect low-income consumers from rising energy prices; 14 whether to
approve new transmission lines, pipelines, nuclear power plants, off-shore
wind farms, and underground carbon-sequestration chambers;15 how much
to rely on natural gas, often hydraulically fractured, to meet electricity
needs;16 and where to site whatever new infrastructure they approve.17 In our
current energy governance regime, the public plays a limited role in making
these decisions.18
To better inject societal values and public opinions into these decision-
making processes, there is a widening call among activists, scholars, and reg-
ulators for the “democratization” of energy law and policy.19 This call
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. See, e.g., Tom Knox, Ohio Regulators Approve Income Guarantees for AEP and Fir-
stEnergy, Columbus Bus. First (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/news/
2016/03/31/ohio-regulators-approve-income-guarantees-for-aep.html [https://perma.cc/
YQM6-8WZX] (explaining Ohio energy regulators’ effort to subsidize certain coal and nuclear
plants); Jesse McKinley, Lawsuit Seeks to Halt New York Subsidies for Upstate Nuclear Plants,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/nyregion/lawsuit-seeks-to-
halt-new-york-subsidies-for-upstate-nuclear-plants.html?_r=0 (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (explaining New York lawsuit challenging the Public Service Commission’s decision to
subsidize certain nuclear plants in the state).
13. See Welton, supra note 9, at 592–94; see also Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and
Fairness, 6 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 115, 117–19 (2015).
14. See, e.g., State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Low Income Program Mod-
ifications and Directing Utility Filings, N.Y. St. Dep’t Pub. Serv. 1–2 (2016), http://documents
.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-m-0565&submit=
search£y+Case+Number [https://perma.cc/AC74-694F].
15. See Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1079, 1101–02
(2013) (explaining process of states granting infrastructure developers “certificates of need”).
16. See Rating the States on Their Risk of Natural Gas Overreliance, Union Concerned
Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/rating-the-states-on-their-risk-of-natural-
gas-overreliance#.WFwqmFcdOf1 [https://perma.cc/8ZMA-P8SP] (arguing that many U.S.
state commissions may be putting their consumers at risk by overrelying on natural gas).
17. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1804 (2012) (explaining
challenges of siting new transmission lines, given the power that state commissions wield).
18. See infra Section I.B.
19. This call proceeds under several different names, as explored in the competing con-
ceptions laid out below. I consider many reformers calling for “consumer empowerment,”
“consumer participation,” “local control,” and “energy justice” to be making similar demands
to those who explicitly label their aim as one of “energy democracy.” See, e.g., John Farrell,
Inst. for Local Self-Reliance, Beyond Utility 2.0 to Energy Democracy (2014), https:/
/ilsr.org/report-energy-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/U4HU-GM2X]; Kristin Ralff-Doug-
las & Marzia Zafar, Policy & Planning Div., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Customers as
Grid Participants: A Fundamentally New Role for Customers 3 (2013), http://www.
cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions
/Policy_and_Planning/PPDCustomerRoleMay15th.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW2B-EXY4]; Al
Weinrub & Anthony Giancatarino, Toward a Climate Justice Energy Platform: De-
mocratizing Our Energy Future (2015), http://www.localcleanenergy.org/files/Climate
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emerges from a realization that the choices and challenges now facing energy
regulators raise difficult questions of values and tradeoffs that make public
participation more important and worthwhile.20 But exactly how the “de-
mocratization” of energy might proceed remains unclear. Indeed, the con-
cept of “energy democracy” has taken on significantly different—and
frequently conflicting—meanings to different actors within debates over en-
ergy law reform.
This Article argues that the lack of clarity over what “energy democracy”
entails presents a troubling hurdle to the project of democratizing the field,
as different conceptions of the term counsel for divergent legal reforms. The
Article identifies three distinct conceptions of “energy democracy” that have
emerged in discussions of energy law reform:
1. Consumer Choice: Energy governance regimes should be redesigned to
give consumers more choices in their energy purchasing decisions, includ-
ing more control over their level of energy demand and the opportunity to
generate, store, and sell their own electricity.
2. Local Control: Energy decisionmaking should be decentralized by local
communities claiming ownership of energy resources and control over en-
ergy decisionmaking.
3. Access to Process: Energy regulators should embrace procedural reforms
that enable more citizens to participate in governmental decisionmaking
processes about energy policy across all levels of government.21
Unsurprisingly, these three emerging visions of what “democracy”
might look like in energy law track long-standing, competing conceptions
within democratic theory.22 Within energy law, however, the three strands of
democratic reforms parsed above often get collapsed into a single
%20Justice%20Energy%20Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP3E-EALS]; Joseph P. Tomain,
The Democratization of Energy, 48 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1125 (2015); Energy Democracy,
Ctr. for Soc. Inclusion, http://centerforsocialinclusion.org/our-work/our-programs/energy-
democracy/ [https://perma.cc/E8MS-GPFG]; Energy Democracy, #BlackLivesMatter, and the
NAACP Advocacy Agenda, NAACP (May 29, 2015), http://www.naacp.org/latest/energy-demo
cracy-blacklivesmatter-and-the-naacp-advocacy-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/738P-M2SC] (re-
marks given by Jacqueline Patterson, director of Environmental and Climate Justice). But see
Nico Stehr, Exceptional Circumstances: Does Climate Change Trump Democracy?, Issues Sci. &
Tech., Winter 2016, at 30 (critiquing the movement of some scholars toward oblique endorse-
ment of greater authoritarianism as an answer to climate change).
20. See Roger E. Kasperson & Bonnie J. Ram, The Public Acceptance of New Energy Tech-
nologies, Dædalus, Winter 2013, at 90, 91 (arguing that the energy transition is at heart a
“social” question).
21. One might alternatively refer to this third conception as “advocacy democracy,”
which Russell Dalton et al. suggest exists where “citizens or public groups directly interact with
government and even directly participate in the deliberation process, even if the actual deci-
sions remain in the hands of government elites.” See Russell J. Dalton et al., Democratic Publics
and Democratic Institutions, in Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportu-
nities in Advanced Industrial Democracies 250, 254 (Bruce E. Cain et al. eds., 2003).
22. See Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy 3 (2d ed. 2015) (observing that the definition
of “democracy” remains contested after twenty-five centuries of debate); Dalton et al., supra
note 21, at 256; David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1703
(2005) (tracing competing conceptions of democratic theory in the twentieth century).
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celebratory mode. Take, for example, this statement from the Alliance for a
Green Economy, a not-for-profit group commenting on New York’s current
efforts to reform its regulatory framework for electricity:
[These reforms present] an opportunity to fight for energy democracy,
so that residents and communities can be full participants in a clean energy
future, from owning renewable energy projects, controlling how we dis-
tribute energy, or gaining the power to make decisions about how energy
investments are made in our neighborhoods.23
With this one statement, the Alliance encapsulates all three conceptions
of energy democracy: residents achieving “full participation” by “owning
renewable energy projects” (consumer choice); communities owning energy
projects and “controlling how we distribute energy” (local control); and re-
sidents and communities “gaining the power to make decisions” about en-
ergy investments (access to process).24
Is it a problem to have this pluralist vision of energy democracy? Not
entirely. At times, these visions can coexist or complement each other. Nev-
ertheless, the theories behind these visions and the changes in energy gov-
ernance that they require are different enough that regulators may have a
difficult time squaring simultaneous pursuit of all three. Consider the first
two conceptions: (1) consumer choice and (2) local control. They both focus
on decentralization as democratization, but they suggest decentralizing in
strikingly different ways. The consumer-choice conception underpins the
movement in several states to create “distribution markets” where consum-
ers can sell energy directly into the grid.25 These reforms would lead to near-
complete marketization of electricity decisionmaking, with aggregated indi-
vidual consumer choices, motivated by pricing signals, driving systemic
change.
In contrast, the local-control conception counsels for devolution of elec-
tricity systems to municipal ownership or legal control. In this way, localities
would gain more say in setting priorities for their electricity systems, be they
economic development or environmental goals.26 Where desired, localities
might also focus on locally siting new energy generation, to keep jobs and
resources within the community.27
Finally, the access-to-process conception introduces a third, distinct re-
form agenda. This conception focuses not on downsizing, but instead on
reshaping energy law’s governing institutions to make them more responsive
23. What’s REV Why Does It Matter?, Alliance for Green Econ. http://alliancefora
greeneconomy.org/content/reclaiming-energy-vision [https://perma.cc/KH6S-PENA].
24. Id. Gaining decisionmaking power might also come about through increased local
control, but need not. See infra Parts III–IV.
25. See infra Sections II.A–II.B.
26. Infra Part III.
27. See N.Y. State Energy Democracy All., Formation, Organization, and Mov-
ing Our Agenda: A Report from Our First 18 Months 9 (2016), http://energydemocracy
ny.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/EDA_Phase_1_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5TU-
QKK2] (espousing this vision).
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to citizen concerns and preferences. In this way, process-based reforms strive
to include more voices in energy decisionmaking processes in a collective,
rather than atomized-consumer, capacity. This aim gives the access-to-pro-
cess vision a political focus similar to local control, which consumer choice
lacks. But although local control might be accompanied by process-based
reforms, devolution would be neither necessary nor sufficient.28 Localism is
not a panacea for participation, and it presents distinct challenges as a locus
for attempting to change the larger, interconnected electricity grid.29 Alter-
natively, process-based reforms might include enhancing public participa-
tion in governance processes at the state and regional scales, where most
energy decisionmaking currently takes place.30
As this Article’s exploration of these alternative pathways makes appar-
ent, these divergent legal regimes—all based on some version of “energy
democracy”—have significantly different implications for the shape of en-
ergy governance. And as political theorists and scholars of procedure have
long documented, process and substance are intimately linked.31 For this
reason, the ways in which we democratize energy policymaking processes
will be inextricably tied to the outcomes these processes produce in terms of
long-lasting energy infrastructure32 and political character.33
Therein lies the danger of the current use of “energy democracy” as a
guiding principle for energy law reform. To talk as though we all agree on
this goal risks cutting out important front-end deliberations over its defini-
tion—deliberations that are crucial to guide major regulatory reforms now
taking place.34 Scholars are just beginning to grapple with the emergence of
these competing democratic paradigms within energy law. Most pointedly,
Joseph Tomain’s 2015 essay The Democratization of Energy catalogues and
28. Infra Part IV.
29. See infra Section V.B.
30. See infra Section I.B.
31. Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to
Improve Public Law 26–27 (1997). See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Pro-
cess: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 Geo. L.J. 887 (1999)
(comparing congressional rulemaking to judicial rulemaking and noting the effects of each on
substantive rights); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181 (2004) (not-
ing how procedure and the enforcement and authority of legal norms are intertwined).
32. See Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 Energy Pol’y 817, 817
(2000) (explaining how energy infrastructure “locks in” certain modes of production).
33. On the links between process and participation within bureaucracy, see Mariano-
Florentino Cue´llar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 411, 470 (2005),
which observes that “[t]he public’s perception of its stake in regulatory policy depends rather
largely on the process through which people are queried.” On energy, climate change, and the
shaping of ourselves, see Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle
Against Climate Change Failed—and What It Means for Our Future 182 (2014). See
also Jedediah Purdy, After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene 265–67 (2015).
34. See, e.g., infra Section II.A (describing several states’ reform initiatives).
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celebrates the ways in which energy and environmental politics are decen-
tralizing decisionmaking and giving consumers “greater input into their en-
ergy choices.”35 Sharon Jacobs’s 2017 article The Energy Prosumer begins an
exploration of the challenges that a consumer-choice vision might pose to
traditional regulatory processes.36 Numerous other scholars are writing
around the concept of energy democracy without labeling it as such: those
embracing localism as a climate change strategy;37 those considering the
evolving mandate and powers of public utility commissions;38 those explor-
ing the relationship between federal energy markets and state policy objec-
tives;39 and those focused on the opportunities and challenges posed by new,
small-scale energy technologies.40 All of these scholars wrestle with the inter-
relationship of governance processes and governance outcomes in energy
law.
35. Tomain, supra note 19, at 1125.
36. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 Ecology L.Q. 519 (2017).
37. See Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 Envtl. L. 105 (2016); Katherine
A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate
Change Regulation, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 669 (2010); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 267 (2017) (reserving the question of whether localism is really democratic for future
work—that is, for this Article).
38. See generally William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking
and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 810, 814 (2016) (discussing the
local restructuring of energy markets that were in response to Congress’s failure to enact a
national approach to decarbonization); William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Fu-
ture, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1614 (2014) (exploring the past concepts of public utility to better
handle with the modern challenge of decarbonization); Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A
Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental,
and Consumer Protection Goals, 38 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 3–4 (2013) (noting the mandates of
public utility commissions and public service commissions); Inara Scott, “Dancing Backward
in High Heels”: Examining and Addressing the Disparate Regulatory Treatment of Energy Effi-
ciency and Renewable Resources, 43 Envtl. L. 255 (2013) (discussing the development of re-
newable resources within utilities); Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting
Public Utility Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 371 (2014) [hereinafter Scott, Old Dog] (examining the history of public history com-
missions to better understand how they will respond to climate change).
39. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016); Fed. Energy Regula-
tory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity
Federalism Is Dead, but How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl.
L. 3 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual Electricity]; Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to
Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1783, 1786 (2016); Emily Hammond &
David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 141, 143
(2016); Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100
Iowa L. Rev. 885 (2015); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 Tex. L. Rev.
399 (2016).
40. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Inno-
vation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1712 (2014); Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J.
Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 Emory L.J. 877 (2011); Welton, supra note 9; David B. Spence,
Paradoxes of “Decarbonization” (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
565, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802231 [https://perma.cc/
CJB2-T29L].
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Despite this robust scholarship on reforming energy governance, no one
has yet probed the democratic implications of these debates. Perhaps that is
in part because the move toward more democracy within bureaucracy is not
universally celebrated. Indeed, it is a delicate time for “democracy” in the
United States.41 Many suggest our democracy is substantially broken, partic-
ularly after the rancorous 2016 presidential election, which exposed deep
fissures among the American people.42 And within the bureaucratic realm,
scholars have frequently noted the ways in which “democratization” of gov-
ernment can hamper its effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and
responsiveness.43
These criticisms have bite in the energy sphere, where there is considera-
ble tension over how to strike the appropriate balance between technocratic
expertise and democratic impulses.44 Climate change presents a particularly
thorny problem for the field in this regard, given that we are all plagued by
well-documented cognitive biases that particularly disadvantage us in solv-
ing long-term, collective action problems.45 Nevertheless, given the relative
dearth of participatory mechanisms to date in energy law—and the pressing
41. Cf. Purdy, supra note 33, at 256 (observing that “now is an awkward time to argue”
that democracy must be the “fulcrum” of environmental politics); Sklansky, supra note 22, at
1706–07 (gathering views of “thoughtful people” that democracy “has become simply a term
of ‘vague endorsement’—a ‘hurrah word’ ” (footnote omitted)).
42. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 Persp. on Pol. 564 (2014) (finding that average Americans
have little influence on political outcomes); Glen Browder, American Democracy No Longer
Works as It Has in the Past, Huffington Post (Jan. 12, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.huf
fingtonpost.com/glen-browder/american-democracy-no-lon_b_2156650.html [https://perma.
cc/2ABQ-6DAQ]; Roslyn Fuller, Why Is American Democracy So Broken, and Can It Be Fixed?,
Nation (June 9, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-is-american-democracy-so-
broken-and-can-it-be-fixed/ [https://perma.cc/YY8U-D6ML]; Brendan James, Princeton Study:
U.S. No Longer an Actual Democracy, Talking Points Memo (Apr. 18, 2014, 10:43 AM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/princeton-experts-say-us-no-longer-democracy
[https://perma.cc/ZYC7-UK4A].
43. See Margaret Canovan, Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of De-
mocracy, in Democracies and the Populist Challenge 25, 28 (Yves Me´ny & Yves Surel
eds., 2002) (arguing that adding popular channels of influence causes processes to become “so
bafflingly tangled and opaque that the vast majority of its supposed participants can form no
clear picture to help them make sense of it”); Dalton et al., supra note 21, at 269–73 (noting
this tension). But see Cue´llar, supra note 33, at 416 (collecting and critiquing scholars who
reason along these lines).
44. See Frank Fischer, Technological Deliberation in a Democratic Society: The Case for
Participatory Inquiry, 26 Sci. & Pub. Pol’y 294, 294 (1999) (“Far too little systematic attention
has been devoted to the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in an age dominated by
complex technologies and expert decisions.”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Citizens and Technocrats:
An Essay on Trust, Public Participation, and Government Legitimacy, in Comparative Adminis-
trative Law 251, 260–65 (Susan Rose-Ackerman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017).
45. See Robert Gifford, The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers That Limit Climate
Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 66 Am. Psychologist 290, 290 (2011) (arguing that when
it comes to climate change, individuals are impeded from acting by seven “psychological barri-
ers, or ‘dragons of inaction’ ”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change,
2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 299, 300 (arguing that human cognitive limitations related to climate
change create a “social trap”). Overcoming precisely this type of trap is one of the central ideas
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new questions confronting the field regarding the future shape of our energy
systems—some opening up of the field is worthwhile.46 But one does not
have to agree with this sentiment to care about the changes roiling energy
law. Like it or not, the call for some sort of “energy democracy” is broaden-
ing, and regulators are grappling with how to channel this sentiment into
on-the-ground regulatory reforms. To aid in these endeavors, this Article
splits open the rhetorical trope of “energy democracy” to shift the debate to
one of underlying values rather than consensus-building phrases.
This Article’s primary aim is to provide clarification, rather than to pre-
scribe a solution. Only after we have laid bare the possibilities and contradic-
tions contained in a concept so broad as “energy democracy” can we move
forward in determining how to achieve it. But this Article’s crystallization of
divergent concepts unearths some tentative normative conclusions. In par-
ticular, its analysis suggests reasons to remain wary of efforts to steer energy
democracy toward consumer choice or local control, which present narrow
modes of participation for addressing the systemic changes needed in energy
law.47
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the regulatory land-
scape in which calls for energy democracy are burgeoning, and the impetus
behind the recent multivalent push in this direction. Parts II through IV
describe in more detail the three dominant, competing visions for ex-
panding energy democracy previewed in this introduction: consumer
choice, local control, and access to process. Part V considers the ways in
which these visions diverge, concluding that reformers should be cautious in
their haste to abandon, rather than improve, existing channels for injecting
democratic preferences into energy bureaucracy.
I. The Regulatory Landscape and the Impetus for Change
A. Some Terminological Clarifications
Before plunging into the intricacies of energy bureaucracy, two matters
of semantic housekeeping are in order. First, I want to address the use of the
term “democracy” to describe the various movements afoot in the reform of
energy governance. As I have characterized them, calls for energy “democ-
racy” are a long way from a Schumpeterian emphasis on voting as the cen-
tral act of democratic participants.48 Instead, the push for “energy
behind representative democracy, which may be more capable of expressing “ ‘public’ prefer-
ences . . . rather than the products of narrow self-interest.” See Peter L. Strauss, Review Essay:
Sunstein, Statutes, and the Common Law—Reconciling Markets, the Communal Impulse, and the
Mammoth State, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 907, 924 (1991) (book review).
46. See infra Section I.C. I leave for future work the question of precisely what the advis-
able stopping point is for “democratizing” energy law. I tackle the questions in this order
because the answer to “how much democracy” turns on what “democracy” within energy law
comes to mean.
47. See infra Part V.
48. Cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 269 (3d ed.
1950) (“[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
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democracy” focuses on methods of citizen-state interaction that go beyond
enhancing representative democracy, for at least two reasons.
First, there is severe distrust of the fairness and effectiveness of our rep-
resentative democratic system in the United States, given well-known cam-
paign-finance biases, rampant partisanship, and (not unrelatedly) a
gridlocked Congress.49 This distrust has caused scholars and activists across
fields to seek additional “channels for articulating and aggregating” citizens’
values, goals, and preferences. 50 For this reason, democratic theorists have
observed over the past several decades a shift toward “ ‘sub-politicization,’
whereby politics is emerging in places other than the formal political
arena . . . because citizens no longer think that traditional forms of political
participation are adequate.”51 Exactly this kind of subpoliticization is now at
work in energy governance, as the field faces expanded calls for citizen par-
ticipation in the consumer and bureaucratic realms.52
Second, there may be particular cause for subpolitical action in the en-
ergy field. Energy policy confounds electoral politics, particularly in the
United States—for example, the recent presidential election featured almost
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle
for the people’s vote.”); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation
284 n.32 (1999) (characterizing Schumpeter’s form as “as spare a notion of democracy as one
could posit without draining the term of meaning”).
49. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev.
29, 48 (1985) (suggesting that it is noncontroversial “to suggest that Madison’s understanding
of the role of the representative has only been imperfectly realized”). Kenneth Arrow’s “Impos-
sibility Theorem,” illustrating that “democratic collective decision-making processes cannot be
both fair and rational,” added intellectual heft to these concerns. Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth
S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Demo-
cratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2124 (1990).
50. Tom Christensen & Per Lægreid, New Public Management: Puzzles of Democracy and
the Influence of Citizens, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 267, 267 (2002); Russell J. Dalton et al., New Forms of
Democracy? Reform and Transformation of Democratic Institutions, in Democracy Trans-
formed?, supra note 21, at 1, 2 (“[T]he public’s preferred mode of democratic decision-mak-
ing is moving toward new forms of more direct involvement in the political process.”).
51. Roberta Sassatelli, Virtue, Responsibility and Consumer Choice: Framing Critical Con-
sumerism, in Consuming Cultures, Global Perspectives: Historical Trajectories,
Transnational Exchanges 219, 223 (John Brewer & Frank Trentmann eds., 2006); see Dal-
ton et al., supra note 21, at 1 (tracing a “growing willingness” to look beyond representative
democracy to “sustain the legitimacy and effectiveness of current mechanisms of self-govern-
ment”); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Econ-
omy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1329,
1332 (2016) (arguing for the creation of “alternative vehicles for voice and participation at the
national or local level”).
52. The movement toward “local control” often involves public referenda and city coun-
cil decisionmaking in ways that extend beyond the realm of the “subpolitical.” Even there,
however, the predominant question is whether to continue to allow a state commission to
oversee private utilities, or instead to replace this model with a locally owned utility, whose
board answers to the city council. This central question remains a subpolitical one that impli-
cates form and function of bureaucracy. See Welton, supra note 37, at 285–93 (arguing that the
question of municipal ownership versus commission control of electric utilities can be viewed
as a decision about whether to “contract out” this government function).
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no discussion of climate change and energy policy,53 despite the fact that the
candidates held diametrically opposed positions.54 To be sure, representative
democracy still matters in energy law, at least at the state level—twenty-four
U.S. states passed a total of at least fifty-one bills related to transforming
energy in the last year.55 But rarely do politicians pass legislation making the
“hard” decisions over which many in the energy field disagree.56 They often
leave to energy bureaucrats decisions over how to achieve the (often-diver-
gent) goals of abundant, affordable, and clean energy.57 Options on the table
for meeting the energy sector’s expanding aims also diverge considerably—
they include constructing more rooftop solar arrays, large-scale wind farms,
53. John Schwartz & Tatiana Schlossberg, For Clinton and Trump, There’s Little Debating
a Climate Change Divide, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/
science/hillary-cinton-donald-trump-global-warming.html (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view). This silence is not limited to the most recent election cycle. See Osofsky & Peel, supra
note 6, at 707 (“During 2011 and 2012, climate change and clean energy had become so
politically unpalatable that the terms were barely uttered by the President.”).
54. See Rebecca Harrington, Where Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Stand on Climate
Change, Bus. Insider (Oct. 5, 2016, 5:39 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/clinton-
trump-environment-policies-plans-climate-change-platforms-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/
SV5M-EBVR] (comparing the Clinton and Trump platforms on climate change).
55. See PowerSuite, http://powersuite.aee.net/welcome [https://perma.cc/4N6R-RAKE]
(results obtained by searching for bills categorized as relating to utility ownership, electricity
generation, grid modernization, net metering, distributed generation, and renewable energy
signed in all states between August 1, 2016, and August 1, 2017).
56. For example, in 2006, California passed a sweeping bill to address climate change,
which it strengthened in 2016. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, 2006
Cal. Stat. 3419 (codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500–38599 (West 2016)). At
eight pages, A.B. 32 is a remarkably short bill and delegates almost all decisionmaking as to
how to achieve the state’s aims to the California Air Resources Board. Assemb. B. 32,
§§ 38560–38566. To be fair, California’s legislature has refined the objectives set out in A.B. 32
many times in the years since, in ways that are often far more prescriptive. See, e.g., Assemb. B.
2514, 2010–2011 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (requiring the Public Utilities Commission to consider
establishing targets for utilities to procure energy storage). But these refinements themselves
came from political engagement at the level of bureaucracy, as debates emerged at the Califor-
nia Air Resources Board over how best to implement A.B. 32’s broad mandate. See Assemb. B.
398, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (renewing and modifying California’s existing cap-and-
trade program through 2031, and adopting several design changes intended to appease critics
of the current system). For details on how the new bill responds to critiques of the Air Re-
source Board’s initial cap-and-trade program, see Eric Biber, Thoughts on AB 398, Legal
Planet (July 14, 2017), https://legal-planet.org/2017/07/14/thoughts-on-AB-398 [https://
perma.cc/CP2G-VTQK], and Cara Horowitz, California Extends Its Cap-and-Trade Program
Through 2030, Legal Planet (July 17, 2017), https://legal-planet.org/2017/07/17/california-
extends-its-cap-and-trade-program-through-2030/ [https://perma.cc/HC4U-YBCU].
57. See Assemb. B. 32. For example, rather than pursue legislation as a way to reform
energy governance, New York State has elected to dramatically overhaul its electricity regula-
tion through proceedings at the state Public Service Commission, which is enacting these
sweeping reforms under its long-standing authority to ensure “just and reasonable” rates. See
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 65 (McKinney 2011); see also State of N.Y. Public Serv. Comm’n, Order
Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework, N.Y. State Dep’t Pub.
Serv. 3, 7–8 (May 19, 2016), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/Public/MatterManagement/Case
Master.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-M-0101&submit=search [https://perma.cc/Z65P-7RFH]
[hereinafter N.Y. May 2016 Order].
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or nuclear power plants;58 turning down thermostats and donning sweaters;
displacing coal with hydraulically fractured natural gas; ignoring the prob-
lem in favor of the expediency of short-term growth; or (relatedly and belat-
edly) shooting massive quantities of sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere to
try to jury-rig a climate that’s been given up as lost.59 Because so much of
this decisionmaking occurs within bureaucracy, citizens and interest groups
wishing to express opinions on these options often have to participate at the
subpolitical level.
For this reason, this Article focuses on how citizens and consumers are
participating in energy decisionmaking in ways that extend beyond the clas-
sic modes of voting or seeking to influence legislators. And I refer to the
broad movement toward this more expansive participation as “energy de-
mocracy,” even though the term proves inapt at times for reasons explored
herein. Sometimes this same movement flies under other reform banners,
including those of consumer empowerment, consumer participation, local
energy, and energy justice.60 I am particularly interested in the ways in which
reformers in these various strands employ the rhetoric of “democracy” in
characterizing their aims, and I illustrate in the coming Parts how all these
calls for reform attempt to justify themselves on democratic grounds.
The second point of semantic clarification concerns what I mean by
“energy.” The laws and governance of energy are broad and complex enough
that any single article can scarcely cover the potential democratization of
them all. Energy law writ large includes the laws governing extraction of raw
energy resources; energy imports and exports; environmental review; energy
transport infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines as well as rail and
truck transport; electricity generation, transmission, and distribution;
planes, trains, and automobiles, and their accompanying infrastructure; the
disposal of energy waste such as spent nuclear fuel and coal ash; and re-
search, development, and deployment of new energy sources.61
Consistent with existing discussions of energy democracy, I focus in this
Article specifically on electricity law and electricity governance—that is, the
bodies and laws that govern how the United States generates, transmits, and
distributes enough electricity to power the homes and businesses of its 324
million residents. Much of the conversation around energy democracy fo-
cuses here because “America does not run on gas, oil, or coal any more than
58. Interestingly, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has long viewed public participa-
tion as a “vital ingredient” in its licensing procedures, precisely because of the many value-
related tradeoffs that nuclear energy entails. See Cue´llar, supra note 33, at 452 (quoting N.
States Power Co., 1 N.R.C. 1, 2 (1975)).
59. See David Keith, A Case for Climate Engineering 4 (2013).
60. See infra Parts II and III for examples of how these terms interweave with “energy
democracy.”
61. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies et al., Energy Law and Policy, at ix-xi (2015).
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we may one day run on wind, solar, or tidal power. America runs on elec-
tricity.”62 Moreover, as Section I.C explains, multiple forces are converging
to make electricity regulators fundamentally reexamine their aims and
methods, opening up room for injecting some version of democracy into the
field. But to understand the impetus for change requires a primer on the
field as it stands.
B. An Overview of Existing Energy Institutions
There is an obvious reason that “democracy”63 has been relatively slow
in coming to the field of energy law: the United States has a byzantine bu-
reaucratic structure for governing electric energy. It involves federal, re-
gional, state, and local oversight of for-profit, not-for-profit, and
cooperatively owned ventures that manage the production, generation,
transmission, transportation, and distribution of electricity.64 Such dense,
bureaucratic layering does not lend itself easily to democratic interventions.
The Federal Power Act of 1935 divides jurisdiction over electricity be-
tween federal and state governments, with federal regulators placed in
charge of “wholesale” electricity sales—that is, sales for resale, or large-scale
purchases made between generators and utilities—and interstate transmis-
sion (large lines that carry electricity over long distances).65 The Act reserves
for states authority over “retail” sales—that is, final sales from utilities to
consumers—and the distribution system (the smaller lines that deliver elec-
tricity to homes and businesses).66
Both the federal government and all state governments have set up com-
missions to ensure that sales terms and prices under their jurisdiction are
“just and reasonable.”67 At the federal level, the relevant commission is the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). At the state level, it is the
state Public Utility Commission (PUC).68 Traditionally, these commissions
ensured just and reasonable rates by granting monopoly service territories to
individual utilities, and then holding periodic “rate cases” to examine, utility
62. Gretchen Bakke, The Grid: The Fraying Wires Between Americans and Our
Energy Future, at xi (2016). Bakke’s quote underplays the extent to which the American
transportation sector remains heavily dependent on oil, but one gets the idea.
63. From here forward, when I use the term “democracy,” I mean democracy as defined
above as the “subpoliticization” of the field of energy governance. See supra note 51.
64. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 38, at 820–40, for a more detailed exposition of
electricity law’s structure.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
66. Id. § 824(b).
67. Id. § 824d(a) (conferring this authority on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (explaining that
energy regulators’ primary task—“the fixing of ‘just and reasonable’ rates”—requires case-by-
case “balancing of the investor and the consumer interests”); see also, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law
§ 65 (McKinney 2011) (conferring similar authority on state-level regulators); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 58-27-810 (2015) (same).
68. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 38, at 813.
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by utility, costs and charges.69 Most state commissions still do precisely this:
utilities come before the commission every few years for a rate case, in which
the commission determines what infrastructure the utility needs to build,
how much of a return on its investment the utility should earn to keep it
financially healthy, and what the utility’s operating expenses are likely to
be.70 The commission then translates this calculation into the per-kilowatt-
hour rates that we all see on our electricity bills.71 Commissions typically
allow outsiders with a clear interest in the rate case to participate as “inter-
venors,” but rate cases remain by and large technical, expert affairs.72
At the federal level, significant changes in electricity regulation have
taken place over the last twenty-five years. Following a general regulatory
trend toward allowing markets rather than regulators to determine prices,73
FERC undertook a fundamental restructuring of its electricity regulations
during the 1990s. Instead of requiring utilities to file their rates, FERC now
allows wholesale rates to be determined by wholesale markets, where genera-
tors bid in their electricity for sale and market administrators accept the
lowest bids available to satisfy the electricity needs of purchasing utilities.74
These markets—and the transmission assets of participating utilities—are
now managed by not-for-profit “regional transmission organizations”
(RTOs) or “independent system operators” (ISOs). 75 These regional entities
69. Id. at 827.
70. See id. at 836–39 (explaining that thirty-two states work either under a traditional or
“hybrid” model of regulation, where the state retains “the traditional [utility] franchise at the
retail level”).
71. See Regulatory Assistance Project, Electricity Regulation in the US: A
Guide 31–58 (2011), http://raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazar-electricity
regulationintheus-guide-2011-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASC6-XPXR].
72. Because of proceedings’ technical complexity, intervention requires significant time
and resource investments. See William T. Gormley, Jr., The Politics of Public Utility
Regulation 34 (1983); Charlie Harak et al., Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., A Consumer’s
Guide to Intervening in State Public Utility Proceedings, at vii–xiii (2004), http://
www.nclc.org/images/pdf/energy_utility_telecom/additional_resources/consumers_guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJE8-ZBFD]; Regulatory Assistance Project, supra note 71, at 29–30.
73. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323 (1998) (exploring the causes of the nation’s
changed approach to industry regulation, including the reduced role of agencies and the new
goals of promoting competition and maximizing consumer choice).
74. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385)
(requiring utilities to allow other utilities to access their transmission lines at non-discrimina-
tory rates); see, e.g., Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (authorizing and setting criteria for the establishment of regional
electricity markets).
75. Utilities opt into these regional markets, and upon doing so, they agree to grant the
system operator operational control of their transmission, although the utilities retain owner-
ship. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764, 769 (7th
Cir. 2013).
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range in size from single state to fifteen state,76 and now serve about two-
thirds of U.S. electricity customers.77
Not all states have opted to let their utilities participate in these regional
markets. Particularly in the southeast and most of the west, states have cho-
sen to forgo these markets and retain full control over electricity generation,
transmission, and distribution (which all continue to be owned by a few
“vertically integrated” utilities in the state).78 In contrast, most states that
have permitted their utilities to join RTOs or ISOs have also required divest-
ment of generation assets by their utilities, such that only transmission and
distribution remain regulated monopolies.79 In many of these states, these
regulated utilities continue to provide all services to end-use customers
within their monopoly service territory.80 But a handful of states have de-
cided to build markets “all the way down,”81 such that end-use consumers
can now shop among “retail suppliers” of electricity.82
Here’s what’s important about this regulatory scheme for purposes of
energy democracy: it’s complicated, multilayered, and immensely technical.
It has but a few formal, underutilized avenues for injecting citizen input
regarding policy preferences.83 A citizen interested in influencing policy
choices regarding her home’s electricity supply might need to participate in
processes at her local city council, her state PUC, her regional RTO, and
FERC—and she would have to discern which concerns about the system fell
under the purview of each entity. Nevertheless, these complexities of the
system evoked only occasional complaint during most of the twentieth cen-
tury, when the United States was dominated by large, centralized electricity
infrastructure.84 The major utility corporations that owned the bulk of this
infrastructure delivered acceptably cheap, reliable power to American homes
and businesses, keeping the public quiescent and regulatory puzzles to a
76. About Us, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUS/Pages/AboutUs.aspx [https:/
/perma/cc/K3LC-9EPS].
77. Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 En-
ergy L.J. 543, 544 (2007); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 769 (noting that RTOs
control “more than half” of the nation’s electrical grid).
78. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 38, at 836 (“Twenty U.S. states continue to regulate
electricity under a traditional cost-of-service model . . . .”).
79. Id. at 837–38.
80. Id.
81. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11 (2010) (coining the phrase “federalism-all-the-way-down”
to describe the ways in which federalism extends beyond the state level).
82. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 38, at 837.
83. See infra Part IV for more on existing avenues of participation.
84. See Hirsh, supra note 1, at 53–55.
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minimum. Accordingly, one of the major questions that must be asked
about energy democracy is, why now?85
C. The Push for Energy Democracy
It is impossible to assert one cause, or set of causes, behind the present
push for energy democracy. The drivers are complex and multifaceted. In
this Section, however, I claim that three developments have lent momentum
to the discussion of energy law’s democratization: climate change, market
changes, and technological developments.
Perhaps the most significant driver of the current calls for energy de-
mocracy is climate change. There is, of course, substantial debate in the
United States about whether and how quickly to respond to climate change.
But there is growing appreciation—both domestically and internationally—
that legally mandated decarbonization is likely necessary to stave off cata-
strophic harm to humanity in the coming centuries.86 Many subnational
governments, including several states and localities within the United States,
85. To be sure, there have been moments during the history of electricity when concerns
other than abundant, cheap power have filtered into the field—most notably, during the de-
bate over municipalization of electricity services around the turn of the twentieth century, the
movement to bring electricity to rural residents in the 1930s, the push for need-based electric-
ity pricing during the energy crises of the 1970s, and the ongoing debate over the risks and
benefits of nuclear power. See Steven Mark Cohn, Too Cheap to Meter: An Economic
and Philosophical Analysis of the Nuclear Dream (1997); Graetz, supra note 2, at
61–78 (on resistance to nuclear); Hirsh, supra note 1 (broad history of utility regulation in
the twentieth century); David E. Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March 19–20 (20th
anniversary ed. 1953) (on rural electrification); David E. Nye, Electrifying America: So-
cial Meanings of a New Technology, 1880–1940 (1990) (broad history of electricity in the
United States); Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progres-
sive Age 135–36 (1998) (on municipalization movements); Richard Rudolph & Scott Rid-
ley, Power Struggle: The Hundred-Year War over Electricity (1986) (on public power
and nuclear energy); Linda Cohen, Innovation and Atomic Energy: Nuclear Power Regulation,
1966–Present, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter–Spring 1979, at 67, 67–68 (tracing the im-
pacts of public participation on nuclear licensing procedures during the 1970s); Outka, supra
note 37; Welton, supra note 37. I do not discuss these movements further here, in part because
of space constraints, and in part because although these debates focused on widening the lens
of energy law, none of them directly called for the democratization of the field. Thus, the
present movement is more focused on democracy as such than any movements in the past
were.
86. The most recent international climate change agreement, the Paris Accord, sets a goal
of maintaining warming to less than “1.5° C above pre-industrial levels.” Paris Agreement,
para 17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs
/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4SB-ZJ3P]; see also James H. Williams et
al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States, at xiv (2014), http://deep
decarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_Technical_Re
port.pdf [https://perma/cc/2KQF-FJKT] (outlining the steps the United States would need to
take to meet its portion of the effort to reach this goal, including almost complete decarboni-
zation of the electricity sector, at the same time its size doubled); The White House, United
States Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization (2016), https://unfccc.int/files/
focus/long-term_strategies/application/pdf/mid_century_strategy_report-final_red.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/TNJ8-39MA] (providing the Obama Administration plan for cutting emissions
80% by 2050).
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have already committed to levels of emissions reductions that will require
radical transformation of the electricity sector.87
Much of the present call for “energy democracy” stems from recogni-
tion of the scale of the changes and choices at hand for the sector. Techno-
cratic expertise provides limited grounds for making these choices. The
question of how to transform energy is one of values: although we have
many technologies at hand to help in this transition—from nuclear energy,
to large-scale renewables, small-scale distributed energy, energy storage, and
carbon capture and sequestration—none of them is without expense, risks,
or complications. Which expenses and risks to bear, and which to avoid, is
far from a technocratically determinable choice.88
That said, the existence of climate change does not inexorably point to-
ward the need for democratization of energy law. Indeed, those committed
to climate change have much to risk in pushing for the democratization of
energy: given Americans’ disparate views about the existence and exigency of
climate change, it is not clear that democratization of the field will lead to
greater action.89
However, there are a few reasons to believe that it might. First, Ameri-
cans agree on “clean energy” much more than they do on climate per se:
“More than 80 percent, including wide majorities of Democrats, Republi-
cans and independents, favor expansion of the solar and wind industries.”90
Second, psychological research has demonstrated that Americans’ “belief” in
climate change shifts in response to the array of strategies available to com-
bat the problem. Most notably, those inclined to deny the existence of the
problem are more likely to accept it when armed with the knowledge that
geoengineering—that is, the intentional technological manipulation of the
climate system—presents a potentially viable solution.91 Similarly, delibera-
tion appears to enhance the taste of Americans for clean energy and energy
87. As of November 2017, 188 subnational jurisdictions, representing over 1 billion peo-
ple, have signed an “Under 2 MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]” jointly committing to
reduce their emissions 80% to 95% below 1990 levels by 2050. The Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) on Subnational Global Climate Leadership, Under2, http://under2mou.org/
the-mou/ [https://perma.cc/8BK2-Q47D]. U.S. signatories include California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
the cities of Los Angeles, New York, Oakland, Portland, Sacramento, San Francisco, Seattle,
and Austin. Under2 Coalition, Under2, http://under2mou.org/coalition/ [https://perma.cc/
NP82-G6BM]
88. Moreover, little is currently known about public preferences on these matters. See
Kaspersen & Ram, supra note 20, at 90.
89. Connie Roser-Renouf et al., Global Warming’s Six Americas and the Election, 2016,
Yale Program on Climate Change Comm. (July 12, 2016), http://climatecommunication.
yale.edu/publications/six-americas-2016-election/ [https://perma.cc/6ZKK-PLUM].
90. Tatiana Schlossberg, Poll Finds Deep Split on Climate Change. Party Allegiance Is a Big
Factor., N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/science/climate-
change-poll-pew.html?_r=0 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
91. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a
Two-Channel Model of Science Communication, 658 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 192,
206 (2015).
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conservation: strikingly, in one (now-dated) Texas deliberative poll, the
number of people prepared to pay “at least $1 more a month for more envi-
ronmentally friendly renewable energy resources” increased from 55% to
88% after a weekend of deliberation, and the proportion of participants
“giving first priority to energy conservation” rose 31%.92 These surveys and
studies suggest that there might be more room for agreement within discus-
sions of energy policy than there is when these concerns are channeled into
the partisanship of representative democracy.93
Even if energy democracy’s proponents are optimistic about the pos-
sibilities for democratization advancing climate action, climate change can-
not fully explain the present push. After all, the problem has been with us
for at least three decades now.94 The major changes to energy law that have
happened over the same time frame are another driver of “energy democ-
racy.”95 In particular, FERC’s creation of wholesale electricity markets in
much of the country empowered new participants, often peddling new tech-
nologies, on both the buyer and seller sides. Small-scale generators know
they have an outlet for the electricity they produce. 96 Small-scale electricity
retailers, including municipally owned utilities and cooperatives, know they
92. James S. Fishkin et al., Deliberate Polling and Public Consultation, 53 Parliamentary
Aff. 657, 662–63 (2000) (reporting these changes in attitudes “[a]fter participation in a week-
end discussion,” during which participants were given “information about the costs and bene-
fits of both environmental protection and cheap energy”). There are limited more recent
results available for deliberative polling on energy preferences. One 2011 study of Idahoans’
energy preferences conducted a daylong deliberative poll in which participants were given a
briefing document and an hour-long review of the briefing document, and then asked to
participate in small group discussions and a panel asking questions of experts. That study
found limited shift in overall attitudes on energy, although the greatest shifts in attitude oc-
curred regarding fossil fuels and nuclear energy (for which support declined). See Troy E. Hall
et al., Evaluating the Short- and Long-Term Effects of a Modified Deliberative Poll on Idahoans’
Attitudes and Civic Engagement Related to Energy Options, 7 J. Pub. Deliberation 1, 9–11
(2011). A 2007 deliberative poll of Vermonters’ energy preferences using similar methods
found increased support for renewables and energy efficiency, and decreased support for oil
after the deliberative poll. See Robert C. Luskin, Ctr. for Deliberative Op. Research,





93. Hari M. Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel make this argument at length in Osofsky & Peel,
supra note 6. On climate and partisanship’s link, see Dan M. Kahan, Climate-Science Commu-
nication and the Measurement Problem, 36 Advances Pol. Psychol. 1, 11 (2015).
94. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
95. See supra Section I.B.
96. Congress facilitated these changes by passing the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA), which required utilities to purchase the output of small nontraditional
generators at the “avoided cost” of the utility generating the power itself. See Pub. L. No. 95-
617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)); 18 C.F.R. pt. 292
(outlining the avoided cost rules); see also Hirsh, supra note 1, at 81–131 (describing the
impact of PURPA).
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no longer have to rely on contracts with major utilities to procure electricity
for their consumers.97
These discrete market penetrations have led to a larger conceptual shift
in the field of electricity. Supply and demand once occupied neat sides of an
electricity diagram, with large companies producing and transmitting elec-
tricity to be parceled out and delivered to those who demanded it. Now,
every consumer can herself be an energy supplier as well, by putting solar
panels on her roof, or bidding her ability to cut demand at a certain time, by
a certain amount, into the wholesale electricity market.98 This consumer-
supplier breakdown threatens many of the basic tenets of electricity grid
design and regulatory structure, by transforming the previously passive
“ratepayer” into an active “participant” in the system.99
One final factor behind the current push for energy democracy is the
rapid proliferation of clean energy technologies over the past several years.
Of course, this growth is closely related to the rise of concern about climate
change, as much of it would have been impossible without policies put in
place to promote renewable energy on climate change grounds.100 Neverthe-
less, many technologies have made more rapid progress than experts pre-
dicted they would,101 such that renewables now form the predominant new
source of U.S. electricity generation.102
97. See Suedeen G. Kelly, Municipalization of Electricity: The Allure of Lower Rates for
Bright Lights in Big Cities, 37 Nat. Resources J. 43, 43–45 (1997).
98. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 763
(2016) (describing the rise of “demand response,” whereby consumers sell their ability not to
consume power into the grid).
99. See Jacobs, supra note 36, at 520–21; Welton, supra note 9, at 611–13 (describing the
basic framework established in the early twentieth century that governed the provision of
electricity from public utilities to consumers).
100. “More than half of all growth in renewable electricity (RE) generation (60%) and
capacity (57%) since 2000 is associated with state [renewable procurement] requirements.”
Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards:
2016 Annual Status Report 2 (2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-1005057.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4Z2-5VEG]; Promoting Clean, Renewable Energy: Investments in Wind and
Solar, White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/recovery/innovations/clean-renewable-ener
gy [https://perma.cc/466N-79NX] (asserting that the American Reinvestment and Recovery
Act is responsible for a sizeable portion of wind energy’s growth).
101. Chris Tomlinson, Renewable Energy Growing Faster than Expected: Worries that Wind
and Solar Power Would Destabilize Power Grids Unproven, Hous. Chron. (Oct. 27, 2016),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/outside-the-boardroom/article/Renewable-energy
-growing-quick-than-expected-10415616.php [https://perma.cc/GJS5-4ZMV].
102. Renewable energy accounted for a record-breaking 69% of all power capacity in-
stalled in the United States in 2015. Zachary Shahan, Renewables = 69% of New US Electricity
Capacity in 2015, Clean Technica (Feb. 15, 2016), https://cleantechnica.com/2016/02/15/
renewables-69-of-new-us-electricity-capacity-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/L8K2-8TQS].
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Until this recent growth, utilities and regulators seemed to assume that
consumer-side technologies (often referred to as “distributed energy re-
sources”)103 would have a limited impact on the overall grid and utility busi-
ness models.104 Now, distributed technologies’ dominance has left utilities
and regulators reeling. A summer 2016 white paper published by the trade
association representing public utility commissioners observed that these
technologies are “turning the traditional model upside down.”105 Similarly,
utilities themselves have suggested that emerging technologies pose an exis-
tential threat to their traditional business model.106
These three forces—climate change imperatives, market changes, and
technological progress—explain much of the call for more democratic con-
trol of the electricity grid. The old, technocratic, closed-door regulatory
model is ill-suited for present conditions and no longer proves satisfactory
to anyone involved, including regulators, regulated utilities, and the class
formerly known as “consumers.” The evolving regulatory and technical
landscape has empowered a host of new potential participants in the elec-
tricity grid—including you, me, and every other electricity consumer in the
nation—exponentially expanding the number of players with an economic
stake in the future shape of the system. And the imperative to respond to
climate change, and its resultant backlash, raises challenging questions about
the shape we want our future electricity grid to take.
Many of these questions—perhaps most, depending on how the politics
play out—are likely to be answered in the regulatory, rather than legislative,
arena. Regulators in many states have little more than their broad “just and
reasonable” mandates to guide them. In states with more specific legislative
goals, regulators often receive a mandate to cut carbon “X amount by Y




104. See Edison Elec. Inst., Future of Retail Rate Design (Eric Ackerman & Paul De
Martini eds., 2012), http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/Future%
20of%20Retail%20Rate%20Design%20v4%20021713%20eta%20-%20pjd2.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/69CN-F557].
105. Staff Subcomm. on Rate Design, Nat’l Ass’n. of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs,
NARUC Manual on Distributed Energy Resources Compensation 15 (drft. 2016), http:/
/pubs.naruc.org/pub/88954963-0F01-F4D9-FBA3-AC9346B18FB2 [https://perma.cc/78P4-
UZDC].
106. See Edison Elec. Inst., supra note 104, at 2 (arguing that “rates need to change” in
order to avoid an “unsustainable path” for the utility industry).
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date,”107 or to achieve a certain percentage of electricity supply from renewa-
ble energy.108 But within these parameters, there are broad choices to be
made among policy designs and energy-supply options, and questions of
how to balance the ever-present worries of affordability and reliability
within an expanding set of goals. These exigent, value-laden choices that
agencies must make put them in a place of having to seek their own demo-
cratic grounding—rather than being able to fall back on the proximate dem-
ocratic legitimacy of elected legislators.109
Before we get anywhere near answers to how these choices will be re-
solved, we must attend to the preliminary matter of the democratic architec-
ture that regulators might build in which to allow these debates to unfold.
Even if one accepts that energy law needs more democracy, significant ques-
tions remain: How will we shape the governance context in which these de-
bates play out? What structures should we adopt for injecting more voices
into electricity decisionmaking? The potential mechanisms of energy de-
mocracy—consumer choice, local control, and access to process—are, in
turn, the focus of the following three Parts.
II. Energy Democracy as Consumer Choice
The first line of energy governance reform that often employs demo-
cratic tropes is that of consumer choice. In this Part, I explain the vision
behind the consumer-choice version of energy democracy, explore the con-
crete reforms necessary to bring this vision into being, and analyze the dem-
ocratic implications of these reforms. The following Parts apply this same
analytical framework to the two other visions for energy democracy dis-
cussed in the introduction—local control and access to process.
A. Articulating the Vision: Consumer Participation and Empowerment
Regulatory staff in California have a vision for the electricity grid’s fu-
ture. In a 2015 staff white paper, they describe the future grid as “smarter,
107. See, e.g., California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, 2006 Cal. Stat.
3419 (codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500–38599 (West 2016)) (requiring reg-
ulators to design a scoping plan to reduce the state’s emissions to 1990 levels by 2020); Global
Warming Solutions Act, ch. 298, 2008 Mass. Acts 1154 (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 21N
§§ 1–9 (2016)) (requiring the state to reduce emissions 10%–25% of 1990 levels by 2020 and
at least 80% by 2050).
108. Twenty-nine states have this type of requirement in place. See DSIRE, Renewable
Portfolio Standard Policies (2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content
/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV8H-A7B8].
109. See Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail,
79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1343, 1349 (2011) (explaining the democratic legitimacy challenge
facing bureaucrats); cf. Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to “Major Questions”: A Pro-
gressive Theory of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 2018)
(manuscript at 30–35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818786 [https://
perma.cc/QTK2-XPD9] (observing that U.S. agencies have strayed far from the Weberian ide-
als of instrumental rationality, and now make value-laden decisions as a matter of course).
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more flexible, more integrated, more market-based, and more democratic.”110
What they mean by “more democratic” becomes apparent in the following
sentence: “Lines are beginning to be blurred in terms of who is providing
services and who is consuming them, especially when consumers start
morphing into ‘pro-sumers’—customers who consume as well as produce
energy.”111 Such grid participation, regulators have concluded, will inject
democratic choices into energy governance by creating an energy future
where utilities and customers become “partners.”112
California is far from alone in its aim to create this kind of “par-
ticipatory” grid.113 New York is taking the concept further: in 2015, its PUC
launched a proceeding dedicated to “Reforming the Energy Vision [REV],”
which will “reorient both the electric industry and ratemaking paradigm
toward a consumer-centered approach.”114 Regulators there believe that this
emphasis on consumer choice will “enable the development of a resilient,
climate-friendly energy system.”115 Several other states are now following
suit.116
These theories of “customer empowerment” and “grid participation”
have become key concepts in what Joseph Tomain recently described as the
“democratization of energy.”117 Grid participation can seem a bit abstract,
so it may help to describe in more concrete terms what “consumer choice”
110. Kristin Ralff-Douglas & Marzia Zafar, Policy & Planning Div., Cal. Pub.





112. Ralff-Douglas & Zafar, supra note 19, at 4; see also Ralff-Douglas & Zafar,
supra note 110, at 4–5.
113. I detail the movement toward a participatory grid more (and examine its relationship
to goals of energy justice) in Welton, supra note 9.
114. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting a Regulatory Policy Framework
and Implementation Plan, N.Y. St. Dep’t Pub. Serv. 1–3 (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y. Feb.
2015 Order], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?Matter
CaseNo=14-m-0101&submit=search£y+Case+Number [https://perma.cc/8HWR-LGL5].
115. Id. at 1.
116. See, e.g., Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Exhibit A: Commission’s Inclinations on the
Future of Hawaii’s Electric Utilities (2014), http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2014/04/Commissions-Inclinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LGR-Y27S]; Minn. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, Staff Report on Grid Modernization (2016); Gavin Bade, Ohio’s REV: PUCO to
Explore Grid Modernization, Utility Reform in PowerForward Initiative, Utility Dive (Mar. 8,
2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ohios-rev-puco-to-explore-grid-modernization-utility
-reform-in-powerforw/437682/ [https://perma.cc/ANY4-9Y44]; Robert Walton, Maryland’s
REV: How Utility Regulators Plan to Tackle Business Model, DER Reforms, Utility Dive (Oct.
10 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/marylands-rev-how-utility-regulators-plan-to-
tackle-business-model-der-r/427681/ [https://perma.cc/3RCU-2D4D]; Investigation by the De-
partment of Public Utilities on Its Own Motion into Modernization of the Electric Grid, Mass.
Dep’t Pub. Util. (June 12, 2014), http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoomAPI/api/Attach
ments/Get/?path=12-76%2fOrder_1276B.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2Q9-KQRY].
117. Tomain, supra note 19, at 1138–39.
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looks like. The overarching precept is that policies will be put in place that
give customers “the ability to not only generate their own carbon-free elec-
tricity, but also manage and control how their energy is used in a way that is
interactive and accessible.”118 In practice, the ideal grid participant might
generate some of her power via rooftop solar panels and monitor her elec-
tricity usage through a smart meter. She would own smart appliances—such
as a dishwasher, thermostat, and washer and dryer—that respond to real-
time electricity prices by automatically starting and stopping based on grid-
wide power demand. And she would earn money from plugging in her elec-
tric vehicle to act as grid storage when not in use.119 Choosing to participate
in this fashion allows her to use power when it is cheapest, and to sell power
back to the grid when it is most expensive. Conveniently, this version of
democracy simultaneously saves her money and gives her the satisfaction of
helping to alleviate climate change.
B. From Vision to Concrete Reforms: Making the Grid Participatory
To reach this consumer-choice ideal will require three simultaneous
lines of reform. The first is rationalization of energy pricing, so that its full
cost to society becomes apparent from the actual price consumers pay.120
The second is regulatory-regime reform, to change the role that utilities play
in the provisioning of electricity. And the final element is consumer
engagement.
Let me describe these further in turn. The first important feature of
consumer-choice energy democracy is that it does not rely on consumer
beneficence alone. Instead, consumer-choice models give consumers finan-
cial incentives to purchase—or reduce purchases—of the kinds of energy
that policies are designed to promote or disfavor.
There are two components to rationalizing energy pricing. The first is
simple cost alignment among energy markets. Right now, most electricity
consumers pay a flat fee per kilowatt-hour for electricity, irrespective of the
time it is consumed. But electricity’s wholesale cost—the cost to generate
and supply power—varies considerably by time of day and time of year.121
118. Devi Glick, Ten Things More Important than the Clean Power Plan in Limiting Carbon
Emissions in the U.S., RMI Outlet (Feb. 11, 2016), http://blox.rmi.org/blog_2016_02_11_10_
things_more_important_than_the_clean_power_plan [https://perma.cc/P68V-5EAV].
119. See Int’l Energy Agency, Residential Prosumers—Drivers and Policy Op-
tions (Re-Prosumers), at 5–6 (2014), http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/RE-
PROSUMERS_IEA-RETD_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP4Z-HWRC]; All. to Save Energy,
Power Generation & Smart Grid 5 (2013), http://www.ase.org/sites/ase.org/files/
ee_commission_power_generation_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/88ZB-BNDS]; see also Ralff-
Douglas & Zafar, supra note 19, at 7 (describing the “smart customer” or “home energy
manager”).
120. See A.C. Pigou, Wealth and Welfare 164 (1912).
121. See Severin Borenstein et al., Dynamic Pricing, Advanced Metering, and Demand Re-
sponse in Electricity Markets 5 (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., Working Paper No. 105,
2002), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/11w8d6m4 [https://perma.cc/X8KY-4Q7N] (“In most
markets, the wholesale price changes every half-hour or hour.”).
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Thus, one element of enabling consumers to make better energy choices is
showing them the true costs of their consumption decisions with respect to
time—that is, having consumers pay “dynamic” prices for their electricity,
which vary alongside wholesale prices.122 Then, the consumer’s choice be-
comes either to adjust time of consumption and maintain low-cost electric-
ity, or to continue ignorant consumption and pay more.
The second component to rationalizing energy pricing is Pigouvian tax
reform. Economist Arthur Pigou famously advocated in the early twentieth
century that the best way to handle societal ills like pollution is to reflect
their cost to society within prices.123 To accomplish this aim with respect to
energy requires better reflecting evolving societal values within the price of
various energy sources. Accordingly, under this model, different jurisdic-
tions—with different energy system goals—might price electricity differ-
ently.124 We already have seen some such variations emerge: nine
northeastern states as well as California impose a carbon price, via cap-and-
trade regimes, on their electricity sectors.125 Other states emphasize the im-
portance of developing renewable energy by requiring their utilities to pro-
cure a certain percentage of their electricity from renewable sources.126 A
suite of additional incentive and tax policies at the state and federal levels
also attempt to better align energy pricing with societal goals.127
In addition to pricing reforms, a consumer-choice energy democracy
requires significant change in the structure of state public utility regulation.
Currently, PUCs set per-kilowatt-hour prices for electricity based on a cal-
culation of utility operating expenses, coupled with a “rate of return” pro-
vided for utilities’ capital investments into grid infrastructure.128 This
regulatory structure creates a risk that utilities will persuade regulators to set
rates that result in the overbuilding of generation and transmission.129 And it
gives utilities a distinct disincentive to integrate customer offerings to the
122. “Dynamic pricing” could take several different forms, including real-time pricing,
time-of-use rates, or critical peak pricing. On these design details, see id. at 5–7.
123. See Pigou, supra note 120, at 164; see also William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the
Control of Externalities, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1972).
124. Which, of course, goes to show that setting Pigouvian taxes is itself an exercise in
values and political judgment. See Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Envi-
ronmental Law and the Search for Objectivity 100–06 (2010); Purdy, supra note 33, at
263.
125. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95801 (2016) (establishing a greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade program for California); Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/
[https://perma.cc/Y5GT-XCCQ] (explaining the carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program cover-
ing nine northeastern states).
126. See DSIRE, supra note 108.
127. See generally DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org [https://perma.cc/JMT6-ARST] (col-
lecting and cataloguing state incentives for renewables and energy efficiency).
128. See 1 Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institu-
tions 35–36 (1970).
129. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Con-
straint, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 1052 (1962) (predicting that utilities will do just this).
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grid, which cut down on the need for utility infrastructure investment and
utility-supplied electricity.130
For these reasons, those states focused on creating “consumer choice”
are also reconsidering the role of the utility—and the structure of utility
regulation—in the future electricity grid. New York has moved the furthest
in this direction: its REV proceeding is turning the state’s utilities into “dis-
tributed system platform” (DSP) providers.”131 As DSPs, New York utilities
are responsible for encouraging and aggregating as many demand-side
(read: consumer) resources as possible, before purchasing any electricity
from the wholesale market.132 Compensation going forward will be at least
partially dependent on the utility’s success in attracting such resources.133
California has taken an even more market-driven approach, which carves
out less of a role for traditional utilities. Under the California Independent
System Operator’s (CAISO’s) “Distributed Energy Resource Provider” pro-
posal, independent companies may bid aggregated quantities of distributed
energy resources134 directly into CAISO’s wholesale electricity markets.135
Finally, the third component of consumer choice is consumer engage-
ment. As California regulators have observed, “If the customer is to make
the transformation into an energy manager, he/she will require a significant
amount of education, advice and other personalized resources that will help
to facilitate and hopefully automate many of the energy management ac-
tions.”136 Practically speaking, consumer engagement could be carried out
130. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The
Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1527 (2012). Some states
have attempted to counter this incentive by “decoupling” revenues and sales in their rate de-
sign. See Regulatory Assistance Project, Revenue Regulation and Decoupling: A
Guide to Theory and Application 2 (2011), http://www.raponline.org/document/
download/id/861 [https://perma.cc/N7MG-9L6S].
131. See N.Y. Feb. 2015 Order, supra note 114, at 12.
132. Id.
133. See N.Y. May 2016 Order, supra note 57.
134. Distributed energy resources are defined as “resources on the customer side or the
distribution grid side of the electric system, such as rooftop solar, energy storage, plug-in
electric vehicles, and demand response.” Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Expanded Me-
tering and Telemetry Options Phase 2: Distributed Energy Resource Provider
(DERP), at 4 (2015), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal_ExpandedMeter
ing_TelemetryOptionsPhase2_DistributedEnergyResourceProvider.pdf [https://perma.cc/73Q
8-2GUJ].
135. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Energy Storage and Distributed Energy Re-
sources (ESDER) Stakeholder Initiative (2015), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/Re
visedDraftFinalProposal-EnergyStorageDistributedEnergyResources.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM
9F-SYHH] (revised draft final proposal); Letter from William H. Weaver, Counsel, Cal. Indep.
Sys. Operator Corp., Roger E. Collanton, Gen. Counsel, Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., and
Sydney L. Mannheim, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., to Kimberly D.
Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (May 18, 2016), http://www.caiso.com/Docu
ments/May18_2016_TariffAmendment_ImplementEnergyStorageEnhancements_ER16-1735
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX6X-VJFP] (requesting a waiver of notice period).
136. Ralff-Douglas & Zafar, supra note 19, at 21.
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either by utilities or by third-party partners,137 and programs might vary
depending on the type of consumer targeted for engagement. Likely types of
engagement would include outreach to explain changes in pricing and bill-
ing, customized consultations on possibilities for grid participation, and the
marketing of available products and incentives that accompany them.138 Ul-
timately, however, the goal would be to automate as much consumer partici-
pation in the grid as possible, with third-party companies rather than
motivated individuals coordinating grid offerings and maximizing energy
and dollar savings.139
C. Assessing the Vision: How Democratic Can Consumerism Get?
In this final Section, I assess the possibilities and pitfalls of a consumer-
choice version of energy democracy, brought to its fullest instantiation. I
conclude that although consumer choice presents exciting possibilities for
assisting in infrastructure change, it rests on an exceedingly thin conception
of democracy.
Those who frame consumer choice as democratic often want to cram it
within the category of “critical consumerism,” which asks consumers to
ground their purchasing decisions in more than just the satisfaction of per-
sonal wants, by instead making purchasing a political act.140 Quintessential
examples include environmental labeling schemes, which allow environmen-
tally minded consumers to pay a premium for dolphin-free tuna or sustain-
ably harvested wood.141 In doing so, consumers engage in democratic
expression by sending a message that they have preferences beyond mere end
products—they care about how a product was made.142
137. See, e.g., Ralff-Douglas & Zafar, supra note 110, at 14–21.
138. A necessary prerequisite to much of this engagement would be the development of
good policies surrounding consumer access to data. See generally Alexandra B. Klass & Eliza-
beth J. Wilson, Remaking Energy: The Critical Role of Energy Consumption Data, 104 Calif. L.
Rev. 1095 (2016).
139. Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid: Technology and the Psychology of Environmental Be-
havior Change, 86 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 139, 140 (2011) (describing a future in which imploring
behavior change is abandoned “in favor of sophisticated default- and preference-setting and
integrated external control of residential electricity”). The theory behind automation comes
from the literature on “choice architecture,” which submits that “default rules . . . can have an
exceedingly large impact on environmental quality.” See Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch,
Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 127, 128 (2014).
140. Sassatelli, supra note 51, at 219.
141. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 584–88 (2004) (chronicling consum-
ers’ willingness to pay extra for the knowledge that certain processes were used in producing
products, even though these processes do not bear on their ultimate performance).
142. See id.
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The consumer-choice vision of energy democracy fits uneasily within
this framework. The model is not premised on asking energy users to volun-
tarily pay extra for clean energy as a type of democratic statement.143 In-
stead, states discussing grid participation at mass scale intend to make
participation economically desirable by instigating the pricing reforms dis-
cussion above.144 Consumers’ rational responses to pricing signals can then
drive “participation,” severing reliance on altruism or other political im-
pulses as drivers of consumers’ actions. The link between democratic desires
and right action is further attenuated by the fact that “participation” in the
grid is likely to be largely automated, driven by company control rooms or
intelligent technology rather than requiring actual consumer effort.145
This automation and price rationalization distinguish energy’s con-
sumer-choice vision from other critical consumerism schemes. In light of
this difference, one might question whether energy law’s vision of “con-
sumer choice” is “democratic” at all, or whether injecting this terminology
just works to induce more widespread acceptance of thoroughly neoliberal
reforms.146 If, after all, one is induced to act by the logic of the market, is
there any democratic process at work?
If there is, such process is of limited expressive value. Enhancing con-
sumer choice within energy law will likely help to break the monopoly hold
that investor-owned utilities currently have on electricity provisioning. With
consumers able to choose among a number of ways of receiving and produc-
ing power, or lowering their consumption, utilities will have a more difficult
time using rate-of-return regulation to inflate their profits.147 Any attempts
to overcharge consumers for, say, utility-scale renewables delivered through
the transmission grid, might be met by consumer exit in the form of instal-
lation of solar panels and rooftop storage.148 In this way, consumer choice
143. This type of voluntary “green energy” program has existed for a long time, with
limited uptake. See Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 139, at 134–45.
144. Of course, establishing these pricing reforms itself requires regulatory action—which
is likely to implicate a number of key political decisions about how much to compensate
consumers for taking various participatory actions. But to participate in these reform efforts,
consumers must engage in more classic “access to process”–style participation. See infra Part
IV.
145. See, e.g., Ahmad Faruqui, The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing, Electricity J., July 2010, at
13, 23; Welton, supra note 9, at 589.
146. Historian Lizabeth Cohen traces the rhetoric of consumer choice back to defenses of
American democracy during the Cold War era. The “consumer choice” as democracy rhetoric
makes more sense juxtaposed to the representation of Soviet communism as the conspicuous
lack of consumptive opportunities. See Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The
Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America 126 (2003).
147. See Averch & Johnson, supra note 129, at 1057–58 (predicting that utilities will do
just this).
148. To frame this in the enduring theory of Albert Hirschman, consumer choice in-
creases the “exit” options available within the energy sector. See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 4
(1970).
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will serve a checking function on monopoly utilities in the classic deregu-
latory conception of consumers acting as regulators by “making their own
choices in the free marketplace.”149
To be sure, consumers that change their energy consumption patterns
may also be expressing their political beliefs, in addition to benefitting their
pocketbooks. Such mixed political-economic motivations are likely in the
case of clean energy because making clean energy options economically ap-
pealing does not guarantee, by any means, that consumers will implement
them.150 Decisions to install solar panels, new appliances, or a new thermo-
stat, or to purchase an electric car and have the necessary charging infra-
structure installed are far from cost and effort free. Because of the effort
required, and the relatively low budgetary impact of electricity bills on much
of the population,151 acts of “consumer choice” around electricity may often
be politically motivated, even if they could be justified by economics
alone.152 But parsing such mixed motivations proves difficult.153
At the same time, there are significant problems with the kind of mar-
ket-based democracy that consumer choice embraces, which have been
widely observed outside of the energy law context.154 First, it treats people
149. See Cohen, supra note 146, at 393  (quoting Virginia Knauer, consumer adviser to
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan); Robin Hambleton, Consumerism, Decentralization and
Local Democracy, 66 Pub. Admin. 125, 129 (1988) (observing that “[m]arkets give their par-
ticipants a certain kind of freedom” of choice and partners (quoting David Miller & Saul
Estrin, Market Socialism: A Policy for Socialists, in Market Socialism: Whose Choice? 3, 4
(Ian Forbes ed., 1986))); Troy Rule, Unnatural Monopolies: Why Utilities Don’t Belong in Roof-
top Solar Markets, 52 Idaho L. Rev. 401, 401 (2016) (explaining how solar challenges the
traditional utility model).
150. See Elisha R. Frederiks et al., Household Energy Use: Applying Behavioural Economics
to Understand Consumer Decision-Making and Behaviour, 41 Renewable & Sustainable En-
ergy Reviews 1385, 1385–86 (2015) (noting that “so-called ‘green’ knowledge and values . . .
do not readily translate into pro-environmental choices when buying goods or using services
that impact the environment,” even in the presence of “strong material incentives”).
151. In 2008, for example, the average U.S. household spent 7.4% of their budget on
energy. Div. of Energy Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Low Income
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) Home Energy Notebook for Fiscal Year
2008, at 3 (2010). However, those families facing the worst “energy poverty” sometimes face
bills upwards of 20% of their income—making electricity pricing extremely salient. Diana
Herna´ndez & Stephen Bird, Energy Burden and the Need for Integrated Low-Income Housing
and Energy Policy, Poverty & Public Pol’y, Nov. 2010 at 5, 7.
152. On this point, Amartya Sen observes that often people act at least in part on the basis
of “commitments” to values that do not enhance personal welfare. And because people aren’t
separately economically rational or democratically expressive at different moments of life, the
same action may often embody both tendencies. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 317, 326–29 (1977).
153. Sen observes that some of the most difficult commitments to measure are those
where “a person’s choice happens to coincide with the maximization of his anticipated per-
sonal welfare, but that is not the reason for his choice.” Id. at 326–27; see also Sassatelli, supra
note 51, at 238.
154. See generally Benjamin R. Barber, Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children,
Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole (2007); Mark Sagoff, The Economy
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specifically as consumers and asks them to make decisions in a consump-
tion-centered framework. Such a market-based system acts predominantly
upon preexisting preferences; there is little deliberative process that might
help consumers not only fulfill but also shape their wants via conversation
and public norms.155 This lack of obvious deliberative processes, coupled
with the “ordinariness” of consumption, causes some critics to question
whether decisions made in the consumptive context can be “easily translated
as ‘means’ of political participation.”156
Scholars of behavioral economics have also given us reason to question
whether consumers make “good” choices, even in terms of enhancing their
own welfare. Contrary to the supposition of most economic modeling, we
are all susceptible to a range of cognitive biases that hinder us, in our
purchasing decisions, from making what we would identify as first-best
choices when we give them careful consideration.157 These inherent human
flaws present a danger in putting too much decisionmaking authority into
the cognitively flawed hands of consumers.158
Even if we could choose well, there is yet another challenge when it
comes to energy’s consumer-choice vision: perhaps individuals do not want
more choices when it comes to energy. It is not at all clear that Americans
wish to up the approximately eight minutes a year they currently spend
thinking about their utility bill.159 This potentiality—that enhanced choice
of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (1988); Michael J. Sandel,
What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012).
155. For more on this tension, see discussion infra Section V.B.
156. Sassatelli, supra note 51, at 225; see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 49, at 2142
(arguing that social institutions are critical in “structuring individuals’ preferences” in ways
that “individuals actually experience and affirm”); infra Section IV.C. Although, the market
can provide its own competitive form of pressure among community members: solar panel
ownership tends to cluster, suggesting a peer pressure effect to installation. See Marcello Gra-
ziano & Kenneth Gillingham, Spatial Patterns of Solar Photovoltaic System Adoption: The Influ-
ence of Neighbors and the Built Environment, 15 J. Econ. Geography 815, 816–17 (2015); see
also Brad Plumer, Solar Power Is Contagious. These Maps Show How It Spreads., Vox (May 4,
2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/5/4/11590396/solar-power-contagious-maps
[https://perma.cc/E3DV-M4PX].
157. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471, 1475–76 (1998) (explaining the challenge of building laws that maximize social
welfare once it is understood that “people’s revealed preferences” are a shaky ground on which
to measure welfare, because we all display “bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and
bounded self-interest” (emphasis omitted)); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974).
158. Of course, as Alan Schwartz has pointed out, it is difficult for regulators to know how
to design regulations to ensure rationality as well. See Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rational-
ity, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1373 (2015).
159. Katherine Tweed, Customers Spend 8 Minutes per Year Interacting Online with Their
Utility, Greentech Media (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/
customers-spend-8-minutes-a-year-interacting-online-with-their-utility [https://perma.cc/
N9DM-GZSR].
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may not enhance welfare160—should fundamentally call into question the
claim that consumer choice adds any democratic benefits, given that these
benefits are contingent on the preferability of expanded individual choice.161
One final tension presented by the consumer-choice model comes from
the potential inequalities embedded in the nature of “participation” within
this vision. The consumer-choice vision is premised upon individuals’ abil-
ity to adjust energy consumption and production patterns, by using new
cars, new appliances, new thermostats, a new electricity meter, new solar
panels, and new storage systems, to name only the technologies now in exis-
tence. Given the technology-heavy nature of the vision, there may well turn
out to be a class dimension to people’s ability to participate in the grid.162
This stratification seriously troubles the central democratic underpinnings
of consumer choice, premised as they are on the “apparently equal nature of
voluntary contract.”163 With economic disparities as they are now in the
United States, a democratic regime founded on economic engagement is
likely to stray dramatically from the principle of “one person, one vote.”164
In sum, the consumer-choice version of energy democracy offers a pow-
erful tool for testing the application of economic principles to individual
electricity decisionmaking. But because of its strong focus on rationalizing
prices, the consumer-choice model presents limited opportunities for people
to engage with the electric system outside of their role as rational con-
sumer—thus narrowing its democratic potential as a means to express pref-
erences beyond least-cost electricity.
III. Energy Democracy as Local Control
Skepticism about the ability of “consumer choice” to create real demo-
cratic possibilities lies at the heart of a second vision of energy democracy:
local control. The following Part assesses this second vision, first articulating
its animating principles and then exploring the appeal and drawbacks of
pursuing reforms in line with this vision of energy democracy.
160. See Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One
Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 995, 1003 (2000)
(finding that too much choice can result in “frustration” and “dissatisfaction”).
161. Id. at 997 (suggesting that limited preferences for more choice “challenge a funda-
mental assumption underlying classic psychological theories of human motivation and eco-
nomic theories of rational choice”).
162. See Welton, supra note 9, at 594 n.92 (collecting evidence that solar panel usage is
highly stratified by class).
163. Rahman, supra note 51, at 1334.
164. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 558, 569 (1964) (quoting Grey v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 371 (1963)); see also Michael
Mintrom, Market Organizations and Deliberative Democracy: Choice and Voice in Public Service
Delivery, 35 Admin. & Soc’y 52, 55 (2003) (“[T]o the extent that wealth derived from market
activity can be transformed into political power, markets can seriously encroach on the notion
of political equality that is ‘the moral foundation of democracy’ ” (quoting Dahl, supra note
22, at 178)).
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A. Articulating the Vision: Power to the People
In late 2015, the recently formed “Energy Democracy Project”—a coali-
tion of like-minded nongovernmental organizations—published a concept
paper, Toward a Climate Justice Energy Platform: Democratizing Our Energy
Future. That paper envisions a future energy system comprised of “demo-
cratically controlled,” “decentralized,” “community-based renewable en-
ergy.”165 Such animating principles similarly motivate communities
proceeding down the route of local control. For example, Boulder, Colo-
rado—a city currently in the midst of a battle to municipalize its electricity
system by taking over from the incumbent private utility166—explains its
decision to do so in this way: “For Boulder, it’s an opportunity to create our
own electric utility—one that runs on cleaner energy, is cheaper, supports
innovation, and serves the public.”167
This example notwithstanding, localism is not inherently tied to pursuit
of climate change goals. To the contrary, most efforts at local energy control
over the last several decades have been aimed specifically at cost reduc-
tions.168 And existing publicly owned utilities—both municipally owned,
and the more rural public utility districts and rural electric cooperatives—
run the gamut in terms of their commitment to clean energy. Some public
utility districts and cooperatives are now prioritizing decarbonization.169 In
contrast, the only state in the country with an entirely publicly owned elec-
tricity grid—Nebraska—continues to get three-fifths of its electricity from
165. Weinrub & Giancatarino, supra note 19, at 4, 8; see also Sean Sweeney, Resist,
Reclaim, Restructure: Unions and the Struggle for Energy Democracy, at ii (2012),
http://unionsforenergydemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Resist-Reclaim-Restruc
ture.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM3J-CE56] (“An energy transition can only occur if there is a
decisive shift in power towards workers, communities and the public—energy democracy.”).
166. Alex Burness, Boulder Releases New Municipalization Cost Analysis, Daily Camera
(Nov. 7, 2016, 3:54 PM), http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ci_30548298/boulder-re
leased-new-municipalization-cost-analysis [https://perma.cc/A5DN-JNM3] (reporting that al-
though the city and its utility are in settlement negotiations to end the municipalization bid,
Boulder continues to move forward in its planning regarding its ongoing municipalization
efforts).
167. Municipalization: An Update, City Boulder Colo., https://bouldercolorado.gov/en
ergy-future/municipalization-an-update [https://perma.cc/X5N8-EEXM]; see also Claire
Provost & Matt Kennard, Hamburg at Forefront of Global Drive to Reverse Privatisation of City
Services, Guardian (Nov. 12, 2014, 4:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/nov/
12/hamburg-global-reverse-privatisation-city-services [https://perma.cc/2ENL-6BV8] (ex-
plaining Hamburg, Germany’s motivation for municipalizing in similar terms).
168. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 97, at 43; Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain, Municipal-
ization, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1505, 1508 (2005).
169. See Peter Maloney, Iowa Electric Co-Op Looks to Buy RECs to Go ‘100% Carbon-Free’,
Utility Dive (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/iowa-electric-co-op-looks-to-
buy-recs-to-go-100-carbon-free/418328/ [https://perma.cc/Y5QS-8HMB]; Kristen Wright, Ru-
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coal,170 despite the existence of significant wind energy potential in the
state.171
What these local efforts seem to have in common, though, is a desire for
more direct control over decisions regarding energy supply.172 Calls for lo-
calism demand that control be devolved from higher levels of government,
and that control be more directly public, via either direct public ownership
or other forms of directly controlling utility decisionmaking.173 Energy is
thus democratized by “putting ‘people back in charge.’ ”174 Often, calls for
local governance have a particular vision of the types of people to be em-
powered—for example, the Clean Energy Justice Project sees local energy as
a way to empower “working people, low-income communities, and commu-
nities of color.”175
170. Nicholas Bergin, Coal Still Nebraska’s Top Electric Fuel Despite National Trend Toward
Natural Gas, Lincoln J. Star (Mar. 26, 2016), http://journalstar.com/news/local/coal-still-ne
braska-s-top-electric-fuel-despite-national-trend/article_790f17ef-d68f-501b-b243-d740aeb70f
4f.html [https://perma.cc/KEW9-PTZM]; Chapter One—Nebraska, Sw. Museum Engineer-
ing Comm. & Computation, http://www.smecc.org/chapter_one-_nebraska.htm [https://
perma.cc/4B5R-T8ZS] (detailing Nebraska’s history of public ownership). Three-fifths is
nearly double the national average. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 [https://perma.cc/B9KZ-GXY3].
171. Nebraska: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.
eia.gov/state/?sid=NE [https://perma.cc/5U96-8HN4] (“[M]ore than 90% of Nebraska has
suitable conditions for commercial-scale wind-powered electricity generation.”).
172. See, e.g., Thomas M. Hanna, Community-Owned Energy: How Nebraska Became the
Only State to Bring Everyone Power from a Public Grid, Yes! Mag. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://
www.yesmagazine.org/commonomics/nebraskas-community-owned-energy [https://perma.cc/
6CR4-6NE5] (“Local control and the possibility for democratic participation are defining fea-
tures of Nebraska’s publicly owned electricity system. . . . Should they so wish, every Nebras-
kan has the opportunity to become involved in the decisionmaking of their local electricity
provider.”); Topics, Am. Pub. Power Ass’n, http://www.publicpower.org/Topics/Landing.
cfm?ItemNumber=38510 [https://perma.cc/E9SC-7XH9] (“Every citizen is a utility owner,
with a direct say in policies that affect rates and service.”).
173. See, e.g., What Is the Energy Democracy Project?, Energy Democracy Project 1,
http://www.localcleanenergy.org/files/WhatIsThe-EnergyDemocracyProject.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TM8J-SBKP] (“By energy democracy we mean bringing energy resources under
public or community ownership and/or control.”); Resist, Reclaim, Restructure: A Call for
Transition and Energy Democracy, Sys. Change Not Climate Change, http://systemchange
notclimatechange.org/energy-democracy [https://perma.cc/LQ6E-YZXR] (“A truism relevant
to our cause: you cannot control what you do not own.”). For more detail on recent and
ongoing movements by U.S. cities to reclaim control or ownership of their electricity grids, see
generally Outka, supra note 37, and Welton, supra note 37.
174. Lisa Nandy’s Vision of Energy Democracy Isn’t Idealism—It’s Already Starting to Hap-
pen, Global Justice Now (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/blog/2015/sep/29/
lisa-nandy%E2%80%99s-vision-energy-democracy-isn%E2%80%99t-idealism-%E2%80%93-
it%E2%80%99s-already-starting-happen [https://perma.cc/CH7L-V3XM] (quoting speech by
British Labour Party representative).
175. See Weinrub & Giancatarino, supra note 19, at 5.
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The “localism” vision of energy democracy at times extends beyond lo-
cal control to emphasize locally sourced energy.176 This angle of localism is
distinct from the emphasis on ownership or control, as locally owned utili-
ties frequently purchase all of their power from outside sources.177 Under
this vision of localism, communities might tap their own solar resources or
erect local wind farms, rather than continue to draw all their power from the
larger regional grid.178
Finally, some calls for localism as a means of achieving energy democ-
racy also have a process focus, including as elements of localism “trans-
parency, accountability, and participation.”179 Similarly, others see energy
localism as a way of “building community.”180 This element of localism,
however, is the least strategized—a challenge I will return to below.
B. From Vision to Concrete Reforms: Rescaling Energy
As a practical matter, localizing energy decisionmaking in the United
States requires either creating a municipal utility, or voting as a community
to take over energy supply through a mechanism known as “community
choice aggregation” (CCA).181 Municipalization is a tall task in practice.182
To fully reclaim ownership requires a city to go through costly, complex
municipalization proceedings. These proceedings, allowed by law in most
states,183 typically first require a successful referendum vote in an interested
176. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“[C]ommunity-based energy is not referring simply to locating
energy development in a local community, but also the control and ownership of such devel-
opment by the community.”); see also Daniel Chavez, The Meaning, Relevance and Scope of
Energy Democracy, Transnat’l Inst. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-mean
ing-relevance-and-scope-of-energy-democracy [https://perma.cc/CWY8-DQAP].
177. See David Schap, Municipal Ownership in the Electric Utility Industry: A
Centennial View 97 (1986).
178. See Farrell, supra note 19, at 15; Energy Democracy, Ctr. for Soc. Inclusion, http:
//www.centerforsocialinclusion.org/ideas/energy-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/TJD9-7AFH]
(“Imagine a community of farmers in the heartland harnessing the wind for clean, reliable
power or an urban neighborhood generating solar energy in a public space that feeds the
energy needs of a whole neighborhood. . . . We call this Energy Democracy . . . .”).
179. Weinrub & Giancatarino, supra note 19, at 16; see also, e.g., Mission, N.Y. St.
Energy Democracy Alliance, http://energydemocracyny.org/mission [https://perma.cc/
5ZHB-D3RW] (including “widespread and meaningful participation” alongside localism in
their platform for reform).
180. Tomain, supra note 19, at 1134 (quoting Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Forma-
tion and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 87, 90 (2012)).
181. See infra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.
182. Herman K. Trabish, IOU, Co-op or Muni? Experts Debate the Creation of Public Utili-
ties, Utility Dive (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/iou-co-op-or-muni-ex
perts-debate-the-creation-of-public-utilities/405511/ [https://perma.cc/8R6C-PQ9Q] (“Of the
more than 900 cooperatives and 2,200 municipal electric systems in the U.S., few have been
formed in recent decades and ‘rarely through an acquisition approach. . . . The economics of
forming a new utility are very challenging.’ ”).
183. Abby Briggerman et al., Am. Pub. Power Ass’n, Survey of State Municipaliza-
tion Laws (2012), https://www-static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/Survey_of_Municipalization
February 2018] Grasping for Energy Democracy 615
city or town. The city then negotiates with its incumbent private utility to
repurchase necessary grid assets. If an agreement cannot be reached (as is
frequently the case), many states provide that the city can exercise eminent
domain to reclaim the assets at a court-established fair market value.184
In seven states, communities desiring local control can opt for the less
complex and expensive option of CCA.185 In CCA, a community—again fol-
lowing a successful referendum—takes over decisionmaking regarding en-
ergy supplies from the incumbent utility but leaves the utility in charge of
managing billing and the “poles and wires.”186 CCA thus gives a community
control over its most valued aspect of energy decisionmaking—what type of
energy it wants flowing in, and from where—while removing some of the
most burdensome aspects of municipalization.187
What does it mean to give a community “control”? This question is
important for assessing the democratic aspect of local control. At the least, a
move to municipalization or CCA entails a referendum vote, which presents
a chance not only for a community to endorse local ownership, but also to
impose particular conditions upon it. For example, Boulder’s municipaliza-
tion referendum required that, in order to municipalize, the public system
had to determine it could incorporate more clean energy than the private
utility was doing, while maintaining comparable rates.188 Beyond that, mu-
nicipalization or CCA also places decisionmaking over electricity supply in
the hands of locally elected officials, typically the city council.189
_Laws_-_Duncan_and_Allen__FINAL___00027359_-1-201504271104.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3UZ7-B2WF].
184. See Saxer, supra note 168, at 1514 (“Courts exercise their authority with great defer-
ence to the legislature, resulting in extensive legislative power to condemn private property for
a variety of purposes.”).
185. CCA is explicitly authorized in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio,
New York and Rhode Island. See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 366.2 (West 2016); 20 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 3855/1-92 (West 2016); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 164, § 134 (West 2016); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 48:3-92 (West 2016); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4928.20 (West 2016); 39 R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 39-3-1.2 (West 2016). New York’s Public Service Commission recently author-
ized a pilot program for CCA. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Granting Petition in
Part, N.Y. State Dep’t Pub. Serv. (Feb. 26, 2015), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Matter
Management/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-M-0564&submit=search£y+Case+Number
[https://perma.cc/UJS6-THHR].
186. See, e.g., Joshua Emerson Smith, ‘Community Choice’ Could Provide Cheaper, Greener
Electricity for San Diego, Report Says, San Diego Union-Trib. (July 12, 2017, 4:05 PM), http://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/environment/sd-me-san-diego-caa-20170712-story.
html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
187. However, I discuss some potential drawbacks to the lessened control provided by
CCA in Welton, supra note 37, at 283.
188. See Certificate of Ballot Language, City Boulder Colo. 4 (Nov. 5, 2013), https://
www-static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/2013_ballot_certification-1-201309061656.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5VNK-TS26] (ballot question 2E).
189. In some places, the city council directly controls the public utility; in others, it does
so through a governing board. Walter Baer et al., Governance in a Changing Market:
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, at xii (2001).
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Finally, some communities have taken steps to include citizens more
directly in local energy. For example, Boulder’s stated reasons for municipal-
izing include to “increase citizen participation in democratic decision-mak-
ing regarding the use of their electricity.”190 Thus, as part of its efforts, the
city has hosted a series of hearings and community working groups.191 These
additional linkages to the populace, though, are largely ad hoc rather than
legally mandated.
Fully-fledged cooperatives and municipally owned utilities have demo-
cratic participation in decisionmaking as a long-standing core principle, fre-
quently enshrined in voting rules.192 But to have these rules in place does
little to answer the question of whether citizen-owners actively engage in
significant decisions made by publicly owned utilities.193 Some publicly
owned utilities report conducting special outreach efforts—including
through social media and focus groups—to gauge the desires of their mem-
bers.194 The managers of others suggest that they can track such desires just
through conversations on the streets.195
Irrespective of participation rates, local control alone accomplishes only
one component of the full localist vision of energy democracy. Although it
gives a city control over where its power comes from—including the ability
to make contracts that specifically purchase or avoid particular energy
sources—most municipally owned utilities and CCAs continue to buy the
190. Verified Application of the City of Boulder, Colorado at 9, In re Application of City
of Boulder, Colorado for Approval of the Proposed Transfer of Assets, No. 15A-0589E (Pub.
Util. Comm’n of Colo. July 7, 2015) [hereinafter City of Boulder], https://bouldercolorado.gov/
links/fetch/25751 [https://perma.cc/R3BQ-7YMJ].
191. See id. at 32.
192. See, e.g., Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, Am.’s Electric Coopera-
tives (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.electric.coop/seven-cooperative-principles%E2%80%8B/
[https://perma.cc/M8LF-5LWC].
193. Some express skepticism as to how “democratic” the modern cooperative really is.
See John Farrell, Why Aren’t Rural Electric Cooperatives Champions of Local Clean Power?, Inst.
for Local Self-Reliance (Aug. 18, 2014), https://ilsr.org/rural-electric-cooperatives-champi
ons-local-clean-power/ [https://perma.cc/YNJ4-S9FC] (suggesting that board candidates are
often filtered through “nominating committees” and run unopposed, and that there is a big
gap between cooperative members’ surveyed preferences regarding renewable energy and co-
operative action).
194. See, e.g., Shari Wormwood, North Star Electric Cares About What Matters to Younger
Member Owners, Minn. Rural Electric Ass’n (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.mrea.coop/news/
322646/North-Star-Electric-cares-about-what-matters-to-younger-member-owners.htm
[https://perma.cc/EJ5L-E2W5].
195. See, e.g., Cooperative Principle Number Two: Democratic Member Control, Tex. Co-op
Power (Sam Houston Elec. Cooperative, Livingston, Tex.), Oct. 2010, at 19, 19, https://
www.samhouston.net/documents-coop/tcp_2010_oct.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZP7-H3WC]
(“Like any successful organization, this decision-making process does not operate in the
dark. . . . [W]e educate our members during face-to-face conversations, whether at our annual
meeting or other events, or even just a conversation in the local supermarket.”).
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vast majority of their electricity from large-scale, privately owned genera-
tors.196 It takes additional steps to accomplish the second component of a
localist vision: locally owned, small-scale generation.
Often, municipalities and CCAs are permitted to own some of their own
generation.197 Deciding to do so can be an expensive proposition for a mu-
nicipality, as compared to the price at which electricity can be purchased
from wholesale markets, but may make sense if the utility seeks to accom-
plish a broader range of community objectives in its energy decisionmak-
ing.198 And municipal utilities can—and frequently do, with great success—
run their own energy-efficiency and demand-response programs, which fo-
cus on cutting energy demand.199
There are other steps to accomplish community ownership that can be
taken even without municipalization or CCA. Most notably, “community
solar” programs have been taking off across the country: as of last count, at
least fourteen states and the District of Columbia permitted community so-
lar ownership.200 In this model, instead of putting solar on their individual
homes, community members can purchase shares of the output of larger,
community-sited solar panel systems.201 Larger systems have the advantage
of economies of scale202 and allow those who cannot install their own sys-
tems—for technical, financial, or other reasons203—to participate in solar
generation.204 Although the community-ownership model has predomi-
nantly been applied to solar and wind, one can imagine its extension into
microgrid or storage solutions.205
196. See Am. Pub. Power Ass’n, 2015–2016 Annual Directory & Statistical Report
28 (2016), http://fusion4freedom.us/pdfs/USElectricUtilityIndustryStatistics.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BH9C-MQAD] (showing that publicly owned utilities generate 9.9% of U.S. power).
197. See Welton, supra note 37, at 312; Stats and Facts, Am. Pub. Power Ass’n, https://
www.publicpower.org/public-power/stats-and-facts [https://perma.cc/7A3G-QSFX] (showing
that two-thirds of the power supplied by publicly owned utilities comes from their own gener-
ation or from jointly owned public generation).
198. Welton, supra note 37, at 304–05.
199. Id. at 304, 332–33.
200. Joseph Goodman & Kevin Brehm, 5 Reasons Community-Scale Solar Is a Multi-GW




202. Hannah J. Wiseman & Sara C. Bronin, Community-Scale Renewable Energy, 4 San
Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 165, 166 (2012–2013).
203. Over two-thirds of American residences are not solar appropriate. See Samantha
Booth, Here Comes the Sun: How Securities Regulations Cast a Shadow on the Growth of Com-
munity Solar in the United States, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 760, 767 (2014).
204. The ownership of these systems is a complex question—sometimes, ownership re-
sides with the community members purchasing shares; more often, it resides with a third
party, who undertakes installation and maintenance and essentially sells to community mem-
bers a right to a portion of the output of the panels. See Wiseman & Bronin, supra note 202, at
168 & nn.8–9.
205. See id. at 167 (suggesting community arrangements are best suited to wind and
solar).
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C. Assessing the Vision: Decentralization and Participation
Localism has long appealed to Americans in general and environmental-
ists in particular. Since the 1970s, a significant contingent of those commit-
ted to a more sustainable world has viewed “small” as “beautiful.”206 And a
great many theorists of democracy have posited that the most successful way
to enhance democracy in this country would be a return to the local scale.207
Local ownership or control of energy resources has particular appeal
when compared to the dominant paradigm of investor-owned utilities. As I
have argued elsewhere, moving ownership—or in the CCA model, operative
control—into public hands, and thereby creating a tighter link between
elected officials and utility practices, may increase the flexibility and respon-
siveness of utility management to the widening set of concerns facing the
electricity sector.208
In this way, energy localism can be easily linked to classic theories of
democratic experimentalism.209 Of course, opening the door to local experi-
ments creates the possibility for significant divergence regarding public goals
for the electricity sector.210 Communities desiring faster action on climate
change might test the workability of solutions that could then be used at
higher levels of government. In contrast, devolution in more recalcitrant
locales might lead to less action on climate change, in favor of other goals.
Although cities cannot fall below state or federal floors in terms of environ-
mental regulations,211 sometimes municipal utilities and cooperatives are not
subject to the same stringency or suite of state regulations as privately
owned utilities.212
Substantive aims aside, it is less clear whether local control can deliver
on its allure of deliberate, collective decisionmaking. To be sure, the mere
206. E.F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered
(Harper Perennial reprt ed. 2010) (1973); see also Amory B. Lovins & L. Hunter Lovins,
Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security 1 (Brick House Publishing Co.
2001) (1982).
207. See Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 953,
954 (1967); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1152 (1980)
(arguing for “new forms of city power”).
208. See Welton, supra note 37, at 332–38 (exploring how public ownership has allowed
the publicly owned utility in Austin, Texas to excel in responding to climate change).
209. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 287–88 (1998) (proposing a system of “directly deliberative poly-
archy” where local experiments are institutionalized via “learning by monitoring”); Heather K.
Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1748 (2005) (celebrating the ability of
local majorities to dissent by dictating outcomes in their locality that differ from the national
sentiment).
210. Cf. Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 Yale L.J. 636, 645–53
(2017) (arguing that decentralization and experimentation have under-explored downsides, as
well as upsides, in that they can generate welfare-decreasing information).
211. See Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91
N.C. L. Rev. 1283, 1293–98 (2013) (charting the use of “floors” in environmental law).
212. See Regulatory Assistance Project, supra note 71, at 23.
February 2018] Grasping for Energy Democracy 619
fact of public ownership at least enhances the responsiveness of the utility to
representative governance.213 And the requirement of a referendum to estab-
lish local control offers a modicum of a democratic sanction to public own-
ership.214 But whether or not citizens will pay increased attention, and
enhance their participation, in these local elections and local governance
decisions is an empirical question without obvious answers.
The idea that localism is more democratic has long been a linchpin of
democratic theorists favoring devolution.215 Classically, a major component
of this argument was that whereas traveling to “Washington, London, or
Tokyo to interact directly with national government officials” proves difficult
for most citizens, a trip to the “city hall or other local agencies” is considera-
bly more doable.216 Of course, in the age of the internet, when “e-rulemak-
ing” and online commenting are prevalent, this argument loses some
force.217 Nevertheless, there are other potential benefits: local decisionmak-
ing, it is argued, builds community and enhances the possibility of true de-
liberation.218 It also contributes to political education, establishing in its
citizens the habits and practices of being part of democratic traditions. 219
Those in favor of localism as energy democracy advance similar sorts of
claims.220
The literature on energy localism pays considerably less attention to the
mechanisms necessary to create this kind of democratic space and demo-
cratic engine.221 If successful in promoting widespread participation and sig-
nificant deliberation, one could imagine that energy localism might
213. See Welton, supra note 37, at 318–20.
214. Cf. Dalton et al., supra note 21, at 252–53 (suggesting that referendum usage’s in-
crease in the United States is a symptom of citizens’ craving for more democratic outlets,
beyond traditional representative democracy).
215. Cf. Dahl, supra note 22, at 105–09 (calculating the ability of citizens to directly
participate in government based on size mathematically).
216. Dalton et al., supra note 21, at 255.
217. See generally Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 Em-
ory L.J. 433 (2004).
218. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future 148 (Penguin Books 1993) (1961)
(arguing that freedom means “the company of other men [and] a common public space to
meet them—a politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men
could insert himself by word and deed”); Dahl, supra note 207, at 957, 964.
219. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 42 (1970) (arguing that
“for maximum participation by all the people . . . democracy must take place” beyond “repre-
sentative institutions at [the] national level” in order to create capable citizens); Kathryn
Abrams, Law’s Republicanism, 97 Yale L.J. 1591, 1605 (1988) (“Localities share histories and
traditions that may be more vivid or tangible to their citizens than those of the state or nation;
it may therefore be easier for citizens to grasp common norms at an applicable level of speci-
ficity.”); Hambleton, supra note 149, at 136–37 (collecting sources making this argument).
220. See Tomain, supra note 19, at 1140 (“Citizen participation in energy and climate
actions can take place more easily as regulation moves from the federal to the local level.”).
221. See Abrams, supra note 219, at 1605–06 (“If we want to foster a self-conscious polit-
ics of collective substantive choice, we must consider the kinds of local institutions that will
contribute to its development.” (emphasis added)).
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engender substantial democratic benefits, both within the field and as part
of a larger effort to revitalize local communities. Yet there is considerably
more work to be done before energy localism can boast this kind of success,
given the limited participation in the governance of most publicly owned
utilities.222
Plenty of theorists are more broadly skeptical about the tight link
claimed between localism and democracy. Some question whether localism
actually promotes greater participation than national-level political de-
bates.223 Others worry that it functions as an effective smokescreen for dis-
mantling the role of government in American life.224 And a third group
questions whether enabling greater participation in local politics might actu-
ally decrease democratic accountability. This concern arises from the obser-
vation that it is often those with the strongest—but generally
nonrepresentative—preferences that tend to take advantage of local oppor-
tunities to participate.225
Without successful expansion of local participation, efforts at energy lo-
calism risk becoming small-scale experiments driven by local policy elites.
Such projects may be worthy in and of themselves,226 but they are far cries
from “increas[ing] citizen participation in democratic decision-making re-
garding the use of their electricity” (to take Boulder’s articulated goal).227
Empirical work examining how cities proceeding with public ownership or
control have assayed to widen participation, and how successful they have
been, would be a helpful step in understanding how great the democratic
potential of local energy is.228
There is also a broader efficacy concern with some of the more politi-
cally inspired aims of local control or local resource siting. Often, local con-
trol and local resources are touted as a way for a community to control the
kinds of energy it runs on, typically in the service of promoting clean en-
ergy. But this rationalization suffers from a substantial flaw stemming from
the scale of the electricity grid. Adding a local solar farm to the grid might
222. See supra note 193.
223. See Jeffrey M. Berry, The Rise of Citizen Groups, in Civic Engagement in American
Democracy 367, 369 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999).
224. See Theda Skocpol, Unravelling from Above, Am. Prospect, Mar.–Apr. 1996, at 20.
225. See Morris P. Fiorina, Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement, in Civic
Engagement in American Democracy, supra note 223, at 395, 397–403, 416 (“[T]he kinds
of demands on time and energy required to participate politically are sufficiently severe that
those willing to pay the costs come disproportionately from the ranks of those with intensely
held extreme views.”).
226. I have elsewhere defended cities’ movement toward utility ownership as a potentially
superior bureaucratic model under conditions of change and uncertainty, as compared to
public utility commissions. See generally Welton, supra note 37.
227. See City of Boulder, supra note 190.
228. See Hambleton, supra note 149, at 126–30, 138 (suggesting that the political left may
be too optimistic about the possibilities that exist for reinvigorating democracy in this way).
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increase the amount of solar energy generally available, but it does not en-
sure that the coal-fired power that the solar displaces will necessarily be re-
tired.229 Instead, those decisions will continue to be driven by state- and
federal-level policies and mandates, in ways that could undo certain localist
impulses. To put this more starkly and concretely: if a state does not change
its energy laws in response to changing local preferences, local clean energy
supply in one community may simply free up more cheap coal for the com-
munity next door to use.230
Of course, there might be aims to local ownership and local resource
siting other than specifying a certain resource mix. “Community solar” ar-
rangements, for example, appeal largely on egalitarian grounds. The NAACP
supports community solar because it “allow[s] us all to own a piece of the
nation’s emerging clean energy infrastructure expansion.”231 If this is com-
munity solar’s aim, however, it is little more than a new spin on “consumer
choice,” since it gives the ability to participate in clean energy as a consumer
to a wider range of individuals. I certainly do not denigrate it on those
grounds—if consumer choice is to dominate the policy landscape, I have
argued that regulators should move in precisely this direction.232 But I would
hesitate to defend it as a vast improvement in energy democracy. Instead,
community solar stands largely as an embodiment of potential synchronici-
ties between consumer choice and localism.233
Localism could go further in experimenting with alternative modes or
aims of property ownership. Already, some localities are “crowdfunding” the
installation of solar panels on schools and churches.234 Perhaps such models
could be creatively expanded—for example, a municipally owned utility or
electric cooperative might institute programs whereby those residents who
volunteer their labor or vacant land for construction of community-scale
renewable resources earn an ownership share.235 Or a community could
price ownership shares in community-scale renewable generation based on
ability to pay, thus creating a sliding price scale that would enable wider
community participation. All to say, local ownership of small-scale resources
might allow for successful importation of additional goals into electricity
generation, beyond the traditional metric of affordability and the newer
metric of carbon intensity.236 Whether such possibilities flourish in places
pursuing local control remains to be seen.
229. See, e.g., Weinrub & Giancatarino, supra note 19, at 4–5.
230. See infra Section V.B for elaboration of this point.
231. Energy Democracy, supra note 19.
232. See generally Welton, supra note 9.
233. See Tomain, supra note 19, at 1138.
234. See, e.g., How It Works, People’s Solar, https://www.thepeoplessolar.com/how-it-
works/ [https://perma.cc/HL3L-A2R6] (a crowdfunding platform for solar in schools).
235. Cf. H.S. Person, The Rural Electrification Administration in Perspective, 24 Agric.
Hist. 70, 70–71 (1950) (emphasizing that the New Deal push to electrify America had a joint
electrification and employment agenda).
236. One example of a CCA embracing multiple aims to local resource ownership is Ma-
rin Clean Energy, which has touted its CCA-owned, 10.5 megawatt, 49-acre solar farm, as
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The broader point is this: although localization could engage a wider
range of Americans in substantive, collective decisionmaking around their
energy future, it will not ineluctably do so. Instead, local control could sim-
ply provide a useful, small-scale playground in which to experiment with
consumer-choice strategies. Boulder seems to embrace this possibility: if
municipalization proceeds, the city plans to create Boulder’s next-generation
grid as a way to “remain relevant in a democratized system.”237 This next-
generation system will establish a performance model that rewards the local
utility “for achieving an efficient, low-carbon, and flexible electricity sys-
tem.”238 Although the city remains far from announcing specific policy re-
forms, city planners have also cited approvingly one report that calls for
moving toward “Energy Democracy.”239 Energy democracy, in this concep-
tion, looks a lot like plain old consumer choice: it emphasizes the role that
consumers-turned-producers and energy managers can play in building a
cleaner grid, and how local control can create better incentives for empower-
ing consumers.240
This marriage of consumer choice and localism offers risks and rewards:
local control may indeed allow for rapid implementation of a full-throated
version of consumer choice. But in serving as this type of demonstration
project, a locality may forsake any promise to utilize its intimate scale to
produce a deliberatively constructed, intentional, and community-wide ap-
proach to energy supply and consumption.241 Ultimately, whether localism
returns decisionmaking power to the people in the more collective vein that
its proponents espouse depends on whether and how leaders of particular
local energy movements instantiate democratic processes as they gain local
decisionmaking power.
responsible for bringing 341 local jobs in addition to renewably powering over 3,000 homes
per year. Local Renewables, MCE Clean Energy, http://mcecleanenergy.org/local-projects/
[https://perma.cc/X4SY-WNQ6].
237. Memorandum from Jane S. Brautigam, City Manager, City of Boulder, et al., to
Members of City Council, 4 (Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (regarding
the Xcel-Minneapolis Franchise).
238. Farrell, supra note 19, at 2; see also Memorandum from Jane S. Brautigam, supra
note 237, at 3–5.
239. Memorandum from Jane S. Brautigam, supra note 237, at 4 (citing Farrell, supra
note 19, at 3–5).
240. See Farrell, supra note 19, at 39 (“[E]nergy democracy mostly overlaps with New
York’s Utility 2.0 debate, except for the former’s more explicitly political perspective.”).
241. Cf. Krakoff, supra note 180, at 90 (embracing local action for its ability to “nurture[ ]
the attitudes, behaviors, and patterns of living that might be most adaptive to the resource
challenges and scarcities of a climate-changed world”); Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World:
A New Relationship for Environmental Ethics and Law, 62 Duke L.J. 857, 925 (2013) (sug-
gesting that “municipal efforts to address greenhouse-gas emissions . . . although palpably
ineffective in one way—they will not directly contribute much to reducing global emissions—
may nonetheless turn out to be effective in somewhat the way Sierra Club excursions were: as
essays in new ways of experiencing climate change as mattering”).
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In Part V, I return to discuss some of the challenges of localism
previewed here, with special attention to the limits of local governance re-
form in transforming the larger electricity grid. First, however, there re-
mains one more vision of energy democracy to explore in greater detail:
access to process.
IV. Energy Democracy as Access to Process
Calls for localism as the pathway to energy democracy presume to wrest
power from our current institutions of electricity governance, which operate
predominantly at the state and regional scale.242 But localizing the scale of
governance processes and resource bases provides only one answer to the
question of how to improve citizens’ access to these processes.243 Instead,
regulators might focus on improving access to the processes that now exist
within energy governance at the state, regional, and federal scales. This Part
examines how existing regulatory institutions might be reformed to enable
more democratic participation in the increasingly value-laden decisions
these long-standing institutions are now being forced to make.
A. Articulating the Vision: The Hard, Dirty Work of Bureaucracy
Across subject areas, scholars and regulators have been devoting in-
creased attention in the last several decades to more effectively engaging a
wider range of citizens in governmental decisionmaking processes. Such
proposals often fly under the banner of “deliberative democracy”244 and,
within administrative law, “administrative democracy” or “new govern-
ance.”245 At their best, these theories might draw agencies, regulated entities,
242. See supra Section I.B.
243. Cf. Jerry Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. Toronto L.J. 559, 561 (1990) (“In-
stead of discussing the transformation of the administrative state, proponents of democracy
have largely focused on eliminating it.”).
244. James S. Fishkin, The Televised Deliberative Poll: An Experiment in Democracy, 546
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 132, 140 (1996); see also Benjamin R. Barber, Strong
Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 117–19, 174–78 (1984) (proposing a
theory of “strong democracy” that is a “distinctively modern form of participatory democ-
racy”); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 209, at 283 (proposing a new model of “institutionalized
democratic deliberation”); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1526–28
(1988).
245. On administrative democracy, see generally David Arkush, Democracy and Adminis-
trative Legitimacy, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 611 (2012), and Cue´llar, supra note 33. On new
governance, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 344 (2004); Jody Freeman, Collabora-
tive Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman,
Collaborative Governance]; and Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 543 (2000). Administrative democracy and new governance overlap, but are not identi-
cal: whereas administrative democracy focuses on better incorporating citizens’ input into bu-
reaucratic processes, new governance aims more to transform these processes into a “problem-
solving exercise in which parties share responsibility for all stages . . . in which solutions are
provisional, and in which the state plays an active, if varied, role.” Freeman, Collaborative
Governance, supra, at 6.
624 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:581
and interested parties into deliberative dialogue about the problems they
face, thus creatively expanding potential solution sets and creating a regime
that is “genuinely participatory, adaptive, and problem oriented.”246
Electricity governance proves in many ways a promising arena for these
theories. In their design, RTOs and ISOs attempt to achieve many of the
scholarly criteria for collaborative, deliberative institutions. They are quasi-
public (requiring FERC approval of operating practices), quasi-private (with
utilities able to exit at will), and a middle ground of state and federal au-
thority, with their regional emphasis.247 Moreover, they have developed their
own “stakeholder processes” that attempt to be more flexible and iterative,
and to provide early input into procedures and plans.248 In their ideal form,
such processes might allow for a multiplicity of voices, including but not
limited to affected states and utilities, to have input into future electric sys-
tem design.249
States, too, are considering how to democratize their regulatory
processes as they tackle major reforms. As discussed in more detail below,
states are innovating in the realm of process in ways that are unprecedented
in the history of public utility regulation. The access-to-process vision can
thus be summed up as a concerted attempt to respond to calls for energy
democracy not by shifting modes or levels of governance, or by moving to
markets to draw on consumer preferences for change, but by focusing on
strengthening existing governance institutions and their processes. Perhaps
extant processes, with their admitted current imperfections, may be the best
places in which to achieve significant change.
B. From Vision to Concrete Reforms: Cracking Open Energy Institutions
If the clamor for energy democracy is to be satisfied through reforming
existing avenues of governance, these processes have a long way to go. I
myself have participated in what I can only describe as a stultifying and
unproductive mass of conference calls aimed at carrying out one RTO’s
stakeholder processes on a single topic. My experience appears representa-
tive: current stakeholder participants in these processes report them to be
time-consuming, overly technical, and weighted toward RTO members’
interests.250
246. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 245, at 66.
247. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 77, at 546 n.11, 548–49, 555.
248. See Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 457, 480
(2015) (noting FERC’s recent emphasis on RTOs and ISOs designing robust stakeholder
processes).
249. Cf. Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 Va. L.
Rev. 953, 957–58 (2014) (articulating this ideal but suggesting that states are given undue
primacy in the current administrative model).
250. See EJ Wilson, Presentation at the Harvard Environmental Law Program’s Power
Shift Network Webinar (Mar. 2016), https://cdnapisec.kaltura.com/html5/html5lib/v2.43/mw
EmbedFrame.php/p/1511881/uiconf_id/27047321/entry_id/1_b8n8sq7i?wid=_1511881&ifram
eembed=true&playerId=Ddata-6b6504ae-4307-442d-87a6-ea28baded323&entry_id=1_b8n8sq
7i (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (discussing case studies and interviews on RTO
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Cognizant of these challenges, many scholars and policymakers are
working on proposals for reform. Most notably, FERC issued a major order
in 2011 regarding RTO practices that emphasized enhancing stakeholder
processes.251 The commission also required that RTOs consider state policies
when planning for the future of the transmission grid, in an effort to align
regional grid planning with the ambitious renewable energy goals many
states have adopted.252
Recently, RTOs have begun examining more robust ways to incorporate
citizen preferences into energy market design. For example, ISO-New En-
gland recently launched a stakeholder process called “IMAPP”—”Integrat-
ing Markets and Public Policy.”253 In this proceeding, the RTO is considering
stakeholder proposals for ways to recognize and account for public policy
initiatives within the RTO’s market structure. So, for example, the ISO
might construct a “forward clean energy market” in which it runs a procure-
ment process to purchase commitments to supply clean energy, in order to
help states efficiently meet their renewable energy targets.254 Or, the ISO
might incorporate a carbon adder into the price of electricity, which reflects
the price of carbon as established by state laws within the region.255 FERC
has appeared open to fostering a dialogue among states, market participants,
environmental groups, and market operators on this topic—in May 2017, it
hosted a two-day conference to hear from these stakeholders.256
These conversations remain in their early days, and even if an ISO were
convinced, it is unclear whether FERC would deem such initiatives legally
governance). Dworkin and Goldwasser suggest that transmission owners maintain undue in-
fluence because they can wield the threat to withdraw from the RTO. Dworkin & Goldwasser,
supra note 77, at 571.
251. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Oper-
ating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,869 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[hereinafter Transmission Planning]; Welton, supra note 248, at 457, 462 & n.27 (explaining
the order’s reliance on stakeholders).
252. Transmission Planning, supra note 251, at 49,876.
253. See Integrating Markets and Public Policy, New Eng. Power Pool, http://nepool.com/
IMAPP.php [http://perma.cc/24X3-FL7H].
254. See Timothy J. Brennan, Nat’l Grid, A Forward Clean Energy Market for
New England?, at 6 (2016), http://nepool.com/uploads/IMAPP_Presentation_National_Grid
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BLS-W76U].
255. See Robert Stoddard & Jerry Elmer, Conservation Law Found., A Competitive
Markets Design to Achieve New England’s Energy Decarbonization Goals 7 (2016),
http://nepool.com/uploads/IMAPP_20160914_Presentation_FCM-C.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MNK7-GLFW] (proposal by the Conservation Law Foundation to include a “Carbon Inte-
grated Forward Capacity Market” in ISO-New England); see also Exelon, Update on Carbon
Price Proposal (2016), http://nepool.com/uploads/IMAPP_20161110_Exelon_Carbon_Price
_Proposal_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PL9-TMSZ] (Exelon carbon price proposal for ISO-
New England).
256. See Conferences, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, https://www.ferc.gov/EventCal
endar/EventDetails.aspx?ID=8663&CalType=%20&CalendarID=116&Date=05/01/2017&View
=Listview [https://perma.cc/7Y36-FRNC].
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acceptable.257 If RTOs and ISOs were to shift in this direction, their reforms
would have some synergies with the “consumer choice” vision. As in con-
sumer choice, one focus would be on getting prices right, from a societal-
goal perspective, and then letting the market unfold as it will. Nevertheless,
what makes the IMAPP and similar processes different from the consumer-
choice vision is the starting point: whereas states contemplating a consumer-
choice future are considering relinquishing more control to the market,
RTOs and ISOs are considering up-front market designs that are more re-
sponsive to democratic concerns, as filtered through state policies. Whether
states and other stakeholders should want these markets to filter in their
preferences is a complex question beyond the scope of this Article—for pre-
sent purposes, it is most interesting to note the emergence of a robust, delib-
erative set of conversations on the topic.
At the same time, much clean energy policy remains centered at the
state level. States, too, are well aware of the need to engage stakeholders and
the public more successfully as they embark on unprecedented levels of re-
form.258 The most pronounced movement in this direction is a shift away
from the predominant use of “rate cases”—adjudications focused on the
revenue needs of a particular utility—as a place to set state policy.259 Instead,
many commissions are now initiating, of their own accord, rulemaking pro-
ceedings that allow for a wider lens onto policy questions of social import.260
In some places, these wider proceedings have been accompanied by the use
257. FERC must approve changes to regional tariffs under its obligation to ensure just and
reasonable rates. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(c) (2012). The Supreme Court has been active in
developing these types of efforts recently. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); see also Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by
Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 Energy L.J. 1 (2017) (exploring
the legality of such reforms).
258. See, e.g., Robert Walton, Gov. Brown, Lawmakers Strike Deal for Sweeping Reforms at
California PUC, Utility Dive (June 29, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/gov-brown-
lawmakers-strike-deal-for-sweeping-reforms-at-california-puc/421762/ [https://perma.cc/
3RCU-2D4D] (announcing of a series of reforms to make it “easier for the public and watch-
dog groups to participate in CPUC proceedings”).
259. Most PUCs have rulemaking authority, in addition to adjudicatory authority. See,
e.g., Administrative Rules, Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n, http://www.puc.state.or.us/Pages/admin_
rules/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/EG8J-EFU3] (explaining the difference between the Oregon
PUC’s rulemaking and ratemaking procedures).
260. See, e.g., N.Y. Feb. 2015 Order, supra note 114; see also Herman K. Trabish, Confi-
dence in Collaboration: Rhode Island Targets a Common Perspective on DER Values, Utility
Dive (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/confidence-in-collaboration-rhode-is
land-targets-a-common-perspective-on-d/425700/ [https://perma.cc/2QPX-ABR6]; Docket
Tracker, Iowa Utils. Bd. (Jan. 7, 2014), https://iub.iowa.gov/docket-tracker [https://perma.cc/
XQV3-CMFF?type=image] (describing the docket on Distributed Generation as “initiating an
inquiry into the subject of distributed generation to consider the policy and technical issues
associated with its potential widespread use, including consumer protection, interconnection,
and safety,” and inviting comments on “broad general questions”).
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of more collaboratives, in which the classic adversarial structure of proceed-
ings is replaced by a more dialogic model, intended to spark creativity to-
ward new solutions and compromises.261 A wide range of civil society and
not-for-profit organizations have expressed their support for further move-
ment in this direction, calling for increased use of transparent, collaborative
processes in place of rate cases.262 Collaboratives might prove particularly
useful in structuring fruitful citizen input, by soliciting widespread partici-
pation on the issues that matter most to people and involve the least techni-
cal expertise.263
If more collaborative, commission-initiated proceedings are to become
the way of the future, they will need to be accompanied by one other simple
but contentious reform: state governments will have to give PUCs the re-
sources necessary for conducting such proceedings. Commissioners may
well hesitate to implement these more capacious processes due to resource
constraints.264 And many of the states that have been most successful in
utilizing these broader processes are also the best resourced, in terms of staff
and money. These examples confirm a point that should be intuitive: if we
want bureaucracy to do much of the work of democracy, we cannot impov-
erish our bureaucratic organizations.
C. Assessing the Vision: Who’d Want to Participate in That?
To be frank, the clamor that exists for “energy democracy” within the
activist community rarely includes direct calls for more “access to process”
261. In this way, these collaboratives resemble the movement toward “negotiated
rulemaking” in federal agencies during the 1990s, which has had questionable success. See
Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,
46 Duke L.J. 1255, 1261 (1997).
262. See Letter from Dan Bakal et al., to Travis Kavulla, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Regula-
tory Util. Comm’rs 3 (June 23, 2016), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/files/2016/06/Good-
Rate-Design-Process-Letter-to-NARUC.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z76J-JJXY].
263. A recent report from the Harvard Environmental Policy Initiatives catalogues several
other instances of PUCs using “workshops” and “stakeholder meetings” to advance productive
dialogues on policy topics of interest. See Ari Peskoe, Harvard Envtl. Policy Initiative,
Alternative Dispute Resolution at Public Utility Commissions 14–19 (2017), http://
environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Alternative-Dispute-Resolution-
at-PUCs-Harvard-Environmental-Policy-Initiative.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DAV-7GFL]; see also
Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical and Practical
Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 611, 617, 622
(2013) (arguing that democratic enhancements to agency procedures should focus on involv-
ing citizens in appropriate ways, on questions where their opinions can be of real use and
import). Of course, collaboratives also have anti-democratic tendencies, in that they limit the
people invited to the table (much like negotiated rulemaking). See Herman K. Trabish, Re-
porter’s Notebook: How Conflict and Collaboration Shape Utility Policy in the Age of Renewables,
Utility Dive (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/reporters-notebook-how-
conflict-and- collaboration-shape-utility-policy-in/426332/ [https://perma.cc/8UT3-L3UJ].
264. See, e.g., Letter from Dan Bakal et al., to Travis Kavulla, supra note 262 (recom-
mending that commissions “should look for opportunities to engage collaboratively in formal,
constructive stakeholder processes that explore new ways of moving forward together, even if
it takes a little longer”).
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of the type outlined above. 265 It seems, in some ways, like a 1960s conceit—
one that predates all of the public choice denigration of U.S. political sys-
tems,266 and one that runs counter to Americans’ serious distaste for bureau-
cracy and the general decline in civic participation over the last fifty years.267
Yet at the same time, the activist community clearly recognizes the benefits
of organizing at a scale larger than the local, and of attempting to have more
plural voices injected into major policy debates over the future of our energy
system. One need look no further than the Keystone Pipeline XL debate that
played out over the last five years as evidence of this proposition.268 Other
examples abound: the “Break Free” movement staged what one major news-
paper called “the largest ever global civil disobedience against fossil fuels”
over the course of two weeks in May 2016,269 and protests against the Dakota
Access Pipeline in North Dakota garnered substantial media and presidential
attention in 2016 and early 2017.270
Protests—a clear symbol of energy democracy’s mounting power—are
one important avenue of voicing popular sentiment regarding major energy
infrastructure decisions. Such protests may “have in them the seeds of a
more democratic politics.”271 Ultimately, however, “unless protests (or their
activists) move inside the institutions in some way, the impact on public
265. However, interest in process appears to be growing. See, e.g., N.Y. State Energy
Democracy All., supra note 27, at 6 (explaining the group’s agenda to change PUC par-
ticipatory processes).
266. Public choice theory borrows from economics’ rational actor model to “seek[ ] to
understand political outcomes as a function of self-interested individual behaviors.” Mashaw,
supra note 31, at 11 (explaining—though not agreeing with—this viewpoint, and sketching its
prevalence and import). For a classic exposition of public choice theory, see James M.
Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Norma-
tive Implications, in The Theory of Public Choice—II 11 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D.
Tollison eds., 1984). For a more recent take, see Terry M. Moe, Power and Political Institutions,
in Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State 32 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds.,
2006).
267. Cf. David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the
Secret Joys of Bureaucracy 45–53 (2015) (describing bureaucracy horror writing and his
own bureaucratic horror story); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and
Revival of American Community 25–26 (2000).
268. See Eilperin, supra note 8.
269. See, e.g., Oliver Milman, ‘Break Free’ Fossil Fuel Protests Deemed ‘Largest Ever’ Global
Disobedience, Guardian (May 16, 2016, 2:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2016/may/16/break-free-protest- fossil-fuel [https://perma.cc/66MW-MEPK].
270. See Eilperin, supra note 8; see also Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Sec’y
of the Army, to Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, https://www.army.mil/e2/c/
downloads/459011.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY9L-VUXS] (announcing decision under the
Obama Administration to conduct an environmental impact statement on the Lake Oahe
crossing of the pipeline); Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Dakota Ac-
cess Pipeline, White House (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2017/01/24/presidential-memorandum-regarding-construction-dakota-access-pipeline [https:/
/perma.cc/5T28-4RZF] (ordering the Army Corps of Engineers to “review and approve in an
expedited manner” any easements or other permits necessary for the pipeline’s completion).
271. Fischer, supra note 44, at 296.
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policy is indirect and uncertain.”272 Moreover, the opportunity for delibera-
tion toward a meeting of opposing minds is sacrificed.273 One critical chal-
lenge for the access-to-process vision, then, will be to channel the strong
feelings evinced in these protests into conversations within energy law’s for-
malized governance processes.
PUCs may be a particularly productive site in which to achieve this aim.
Some critique the “just and reasonable” standard governing PUC decision-
making as providing almost no substantive boundaries to commission au-
thority.274 At the same time, this broad mandate offers considerable leeway
for injecting new considerations and processes into long-standing legal re-
gimes.275 A clamor of voices presenting new ideas of what citizens and rate-
payers want out of these systems might have considerable power in shaping
what just and reasonable energy policy looks like in the future. And the
potential payoff of participation increases as more state commissions begin
to fundamentally reexamine their legal regimes governing electricity.276
One must, however, have faith in the ability of deliberative democracy
to infiltrate and influence energy institutions to buy into this vision. Such
faith is currently in short supply.277 For several decades, public choice schol-
ars have propounded the “interest group” representation model of the state,
which views all outcomes as bargains that benefit special interests to the
detriment of the general welfare.278 These theories’ emphasis on the links
between political power and regulatory outcomes casts into doubt the ability
of citizens to meaningfully change outcomes based on participation and de-
liberation. But these theories are not without their forceful critics, who make
an important point of comparative institutional competence279 when it
272. Dalton et al., supra note 21, at 251; see also David Treuer, An Indian Protest for Every-
one, N.Y. Times (Nov. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/opinion/sunday/an-in
dian-protest-for-everyone.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (eloquently making
this same point with respect to the Standing Rock Protests over the North Dakota Access
pipeline).
273. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 1
(1996) (“[W]hen citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to
reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions.”).
274. See, e.g., Elesha Simenov, Note, Just Not Reasonable: What the FERC’s Order on De-
mand Response Reveals About the Current Shortfalls in “Just and Reasonable” Rulemaking, 31
Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 311, 326 (2012) (arguing that the “just and reasonable”
standard provides no “defined method for dealing with new and complicated technologies”).
275. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1, 7 (2014) (describing how FERC must use a dated statute to cope with new problems); Scott,
Old Dog, supra note 38, at 375.
276. See supra notes 114–116.
277. See Mashaw, supra note 31, at 26–29 (critiquing the way public choice theory risks
creating the dread government it imagines); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev.
199, 202 (1988) (suggesting that public choice theorists caused “the democratic sphere” to
“become[ ] the embodiment of, if not evil, then abject failure”).
278. See Mashaw, supra note 31.
279. Cf. Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy (1994).
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comes to administrative democracy: agencies in fact may be subject to fewer
of these pathologies than elected officials, making them a comparatively bet-
ter place in which deliberation might occur.280 Indeed, precisely because of
their “greater expertise and fewer immediate political pressures,” agencies
may be the best place for deliberation to occur.281
Even if powerful corporate interests do at times dominate agency
processes,282 there is another reason to push for their reform rather than
abandonment: to a large extent, we get the bureaucracy we build. To pre-
sume that one should not attempt to reform or intervene in these processes
because only industry participates becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.283 Only
by actively seeking to make RTOs, PUCs, and other government entities
more open to a wider range of viewpoints can those outside the process
hope to influence the decisions that these agencies control.284
The most optimistic studies of democratizing regulatory processes sug-
gest that the lay public is quite interested in commenting on certain regula-
tions, and that their comments “nearly always raise concerns that are
relevant to the agency’s legal mandate.”285 Particularly as the issues con-
fronting energy law become more value laden, and thus amenable to lay
input, energy law might import some of these ideas.
That said, energy regulators confront in spades a challenge that plagues
administrative democracy more generally: the “fundamental incongruence
between the way that ‘insiders’ think and talk . . . and the ways that novice
280. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
Geo. L.J. 97, 101, 106 (arguing that “agency policymaking is often . . . desired by voters”
because it produces the result that voters would have come to “if they had the time and re-
sources to devote to the problem”); see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 49, at 2193.
281. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. 1511, 1515 (1992).
282. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and
a Vision for Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 77,
82 (2013) (finding that few rules receive comments, and most of these come from regulated
entities); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic
Emission Standards, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 99, 103–04 (2011) (finding imbalances in interest-
group participation “over the entire life cycle” of certain environmental regulations); Jason
Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence
on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. Pol. 128, 137 (2006). But see Cue´llar, supra note 33, at 460
(finding that for two of the three regulations he studied, “comments from individual members
of the lay public account[ed] for over 70% of comments”).
283. See Mashaw, supra note 31, at 26–27.
284. On this point, Rachel Barkow offers helpful starting suggestions as to how attention
to institutional design can better empower less influential groups. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insu-
lating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15 (2010); see
also Dorothy M. Daley & Tony G. Reames, Public Participation and Environmental Justice, in
Failed Promises: Evaluating the Federal Government’s Response to Environmental
Justice 143, 145–46 (David M. Konisky ed., 2015) (arguing that well-done participation can
“can increase equity, reduce conflict and gridlock, and lead to improved environmental deci-
sion making”); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive
Essay, 94 Yale L.J. 1617, 1627 (1985).
285. Cue´llar, supra note 33, at 414.
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commenters do.”286 To effectively accommodate democratic demands within
existing processes, regulators will have to become more adept at accepting
“situated knowledge”—that is, knowledge that is “highly contextualized, ex-
periential, [and] often communicated in the form of personal stories.”287
The challenge of incorporating this kind of knowledge is most acute in
RTOs, which operate through opaque, technical, deeply bureaucratic, and
meeting-dense processes.288 It is simply unlikely that a substantial number of
individual citizens or small groups might participate in these endeavors, ow-
ing to both cognitive and resource constraints.289 Because of these con-
straints, interest groups and state representatives—standing as the voice of
their members or polities—are the major players in RTO proceedings.290
And in terms of interest groups’ member connection, “almost all are led by
resident professional staffs, and funded more by outside donors or commer-
cial side ventures than from membership dues.”291 Thus, if one falls into the
camp that believes that national-scale interest groups “are no substitute for
more personal forms of political engagement,”292 then RTOs remain chal-
lenging sites for democracy building.293 At the least, serious thought should
be given to the way that groups participating in RTO stakeholder processes
establish their positions on the significant democratic questions present in
energy governance, in an attempt to gauge which groups best channel public
views.294 Moreover, policymakers might be particularly wary of using RTOs
286. Cynthia R. Farina et al., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public
Rulemaking Participation, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1185, 1187 (2012); see also Mendelson,
supra note 109, at 1346.
287. Farina et al., supra note 286, at 1187.
288. See Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems:
Policy Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission Organizations, 21
Energy Res. & Soc. Sci. 222, 230-31 (2016) (reporting the results of interviews with RTO
stakeholder participants, including comments on the sheer number of meetings and the fact
that to participate effectively, “you have to be a combination of an economist and a math
wizard”).
289. See Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Civic Participation and the Equality Problem, in
Civic Engagement in American Democracy, supra note 223, at 427, 431–38 (finding that
the “skew” in political participation based on high levels of education or income is “especially
pronounced” in the United States); Rahman, supra note 51, at 1330.
290. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 77, at 571; see also Seifter, supra note 249, at
963–69 (suggesting that the fact that states are primarily represented at FERC by their national
association creates perverse results in the positions taken).
291. Skocpol, supra note 224, at 24.
292. Putnam, supra note 267, at 344.
293. See Mintrom, supra note 164, at 61; see also Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets
and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legiti-
macy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 185 (1977–1978). But see Berry, supra note 223, at 369 (defending the
importance of national interest groups against criticisms that they represent only “thin”
democracy).
294. Miriam Seifter has recently argued that agency participation can only be justified on
grounds of democratic legitimacy if participants “channel the will of the public majority.”
Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1300, 1324
(2016). I think this argument overstates the challenge, since the theory of constructing a more
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as loci of policymaking, instead of state PUCs, if they are less capable of
engendering participation.
State PUC decisionmaking processes enjoy somewhat broader participa-
tion than these densely technical, often obscure RTO stakeholder-driven
processes. Particularly when it comes to major reform or topics that interest
the public at large, there does appear to be an appetite to participate at the
PUC level. For example, 300-plus stakeholders have weighed in on New
York’s recent effort at major electricity regulatory reform, including many
small community groups.295 The New York commission’s use of numerous
public hearings and collaborative processes tracks some of the recommenda-
tions that scholars outside the energy law field have made regarding how to
broaden administrative “democracy.”296
One particularly noteworthy example comes from the efforts of the “En-
ergy Democracy Alliance,” a group working to inject its vision of energy
democracy297 into New York’s regulatory reforms.298 One of the Alliance’s
main concerns has been energy affordability in the face of the commission’s
many consumer-centered reforms.299 To address these concerns, New York’s
commission instituted a proceeding to consider the effects of its reform
agenda on low-income utility customers.300 After approximately a year of
study and meetings, the commission announced in 2016 a major expansion
deliberative administrative state is that the process of deliberation itself may improve outcomes
without requiring perfect representation. Nevertheless, Seifter adeptly identifies challenges in
relying on interest groups as channels for public representation without also knowing whether
the group “actually speak[s] for a membership.” Id. at 1300.
295. See Matter Master: 14-00581/14-M-0101, N.Y. St. Dep’t Pub. Serv., http://docu
ments.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-M-0101&
submit=search [https://perma.cc/23HL-HNRR] (showing 310 participants).
296. See Fiorina, supra note 225, at 414 (arguing that the cure to skewed participation “is
even more civic engagement” to dilute the outlier voices); Arkush, supra note 245, at 611;
David J. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1458, 1458 (2013); Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Peti-
tions and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 321, 325
(2010); Cue´llar, supra note 33, at 469–72; Cynthia R. Farina et al., Regulation Room: Getting
“More, Better” Civic Participation in Complex Government Policymaking, 7 Transforming
Gov’t 501, 501 (2013); Fishkin, supra note 244, at 134; David Fontana, Reforming the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act: Democracy Index Rulemaking, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 81, 82–83 (2005);
Frug, supra note 243, at 562; William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Adminis-
trative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 171, 171–72 (2009);
Mendelson, supra note 109, at 1346; Noveck, supra note 217, at 437–38; Peter M. Shane, Em-
powering the Collaborative Citizen in the Administrative State: A Case Study of the Federal Com-
munications Commission, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 483 (2011).
297. For the Alliance’s mission, see About Us, N.Y. Energy Democracy Alliance, http://
energydemocracyny.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/AQR2-455K].
298. See N.Y. Feb. 2015 Order, supra note 114.
299. Policy Priorities, N.Y. Energy Democracy Alliance, http://energydemocracyny.org/
policy-priorities [https://perma.cc/Y3BZ-LG9M].
300. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceeding, N.Y. State Dep’t
Pub. Serv. 1 (Jan. 9, 2015), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/Case
Master.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-m-0565&submit=search£y+Case+Number [https://perma.cc/
9VXF-G4GW].
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of its low-income programs: the new policy targets a total allowable “energy
burden” for households of 6% of income301 and consequently expands
spending on low-income programs by 87%.302 Both activists and the com-
mission credit these reforms largely to successful citizen participation: dur-
ing twelve public hearings, over 100 speakers generated 600 pages of
testimony attesting to the “difficulties that they have faced paying for service,
and the need to improve energy affordability for the poorest New
Yorkers.”303 This outcome demonstrates the ability of “situated knowledge”
to contribute to significant electricity law reform through well-executed ac-
cess to process.304
One final concern with an access-to-process vision of democracy comes
from asking what is lost when access is gained. More specifically, some
worry that drawing protest groups and activists within bureaucratic
processes deradicalizes their demands and saps the strength of their move-
ments.305 There is, perhaps, glory in the struggle against government that
cannot be replicated in a daylong, windowless meeting within the halls of
power.306 Relatedly, too many of these meetings—that is to say, too much
participation—might bog down institutions, impeding them from achieving
their goals.307 Striking the right amount of access to process is thus a chal-
lenge that rarely will leave all sides satisfied.
The access-to-process vision of energy democracy thus faces all the chal-
lenges that have plagued efforts to inject more participation in bureaucracy
across other subject areas. But it also is the only vision of energy democracy
301. “Energy burden” refers to the percentage of household earnings that go toward pay-
ing energy bills. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Low Income Program
Modifications and Directing Utility Filings, N.Y. St. Dep’t Pub. Serv. 3, 7–8 (2016), http://doc
uments.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-m-0565&
submit=search£y+Case+Number [https://perma.cc/AC74-694F].
302. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Low Income Program Modifica-
tions and Directing Utility Filings, N.Y. St. Dep’t Pub. Serv. 4 (2016), http://documents.
dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={BC2F31C9-B563-4DD6-B1EA-81A83
0B77276} [https://perma.cc/AC74-694F].
303. See id. at 7; see also N.Y. State Energy Democracy All., supra note 27, at 8–9.
304. I provide a much more detailed account of this proceeding in Shelley Welton, Grid
Modernization and Energy Poverty, 18 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 555, 596–606 (2017).
305. See Sklansky, supra note 22, at 1766 (explaining how participatory democracy can
become “a rhetoric of apology” if “the mere possibility of participation can be invoked to
legitimize decisions as democratic”).
306. See Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2004) (arguing that
democracy must be much more than participation in institutions); Bernard E. Harcourt, Su-
preme Court Review—Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radi-
cal Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers, 94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 503, 512
(2004) (exploring “a politics that embraces the marginal, even criminal desire to transgress for
the sake of transgression, that thrives on rebellion against hegemonic legal regimes”).
307. See Michael Schudson, The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the
Culture of Transparency, 1945–1975, at 4 (2015) (cataloguing the “limits to the value of
openness”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 173, 178 (1997).
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that specifically aims to facilitate scale-appropriate dialogue about what
Americans want out of their electricity supply. In the final Part that follows,
I defend this aspiration of the access-to-process vision, and explore more
completely the reasons that I believe the two other visions fall short in this
regard.
V. Coming to Terms
As has long been the case with questions of participation, power, and
democracy generally, there is no perfect answer when it comes to how best
to achieve democratization in the realm of energy governance. There are
benefits and drawbacks to all three visions of “energy democracy.” Yet, al-
though a decisive choice in favor of one vision and its attendant reforms
may not be warranted, I argue in this Part that there are reasons to be wary
of the movement toward consumer choice and local control as antidotes to
mounting frustration with the technocratic nature of centralized energy bu-
reaucracies. Each of these visions presents a risk of diminishing the force
and function of the access-to-process vision, without necessarily offering up
a better replacement. To make this case, this final Part puts the access-to-
process vision into comparison with consumer choice and localism to sug-
gest some shortcomings each of these alternatives to traditional citizen par-
ticipation has in the energy law context. It also briefly suggests some ways
that regulators might work to overcome or dampen these weaknesses.
A. Consumer Choice and Access to Process
I find particular cause for concern in the notion that consumer-choice
reforms in energy law will quench the growing thirst for democratization.
Consumer-choice energy democracy asks people to participate as consumers
in making choices about their energy supply. This opportunity to coop-
timize energy consumption and monetary savings might present a neoliberal
fantasy for the gadget obsessed,308 but it is likely to prove overwhelming and
annoying to most of us.309 Early empirical data suggest that most customers
prefer to delegate energy choices to companies and technologies that will
optimize and automate them for us.310 If this trend continues, then energy-
supply decisions in the consumer-choice framework will turn largely upon
the revenue opportunities presented to these companies.311 What role, then,
is left for everyday energy users to make their preferences known?
308. The brilliant and caustic William Boyd deserves credit for suggesting this phrase to
me.
309. See Eisen, supra note 40, at 1722–23.
310. Elisabeth Du¨tschke & Alexandra-Gwyn Paetz, Dynamic Electricity Pricing—Which
Programs Do Consumers Prefer?, 59 Energy Pol’y 226, 226 (2013) (finding that “smart home
technologies including demand automation” proved a “prerequisite” for consumer-side en-
gagement in European field tests of dynamic pricing); Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and
Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2013).
311. See N.Y. May 2016 Order, supra note 57, at 40–41.
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My worry is this: a full-throated consumer-choice vision is likely to offer
limited outlets for expressing considered preferences on energy supply. At
the same time, redesigning governance to accomplish this vision may dimin-
ish Americans’ interest in participating in many of the centralized processes
we currently have for collectively making major energy infrastructure deci-
sions. Put differently, consumer-choice versions of energy democracy come
specifically at the impoverishment of central mechanisms for planning our
energy transition: where consumer choice reigns, regulatory power is trans-
formed from grid-wide planning and priority setting, into a focus on busi-
ness-model design and oversight. Although processes may still nominally be
in place for consumers to express preferences on these new regulatory pri-
orities, the topics and choices on the table are unlikely to attract robust
consideration.
New York may stand as a cautionary tale in this regard. As noted earlier,
regulators there are transforming the state’s utilities into “distributed system
platform provider[s],” by which they mean electric grid coordinators, capa-
ble of running a market that dispatches customer-sited distributed energy
resources in the same way that wholesale electricity markets coordinate
large-scale utility offerings. 312 To get utilities on board, regulators have of-
fered them the chance to propose new modes of earning revenues, with
earnings tied to the utility’s ability to successfully deploy increasing quanti-
ties of distributed resources.313 In simpler terms, here’s the arrangement:
New York utilities will now be in charge of promoting distributed energy,
and they’ll make their decisions in this regard based on what will earn them
the most revenue under new business models established by the
commission.
New York’s plan may prove to be a highly effective method for de-
ploying maximum quantities of distributed energy resources.314 And there
has certainly been considerable citizen input into its contours. As noted
above, the process of overhauling the state’s utility system has provoked out-
standing levels of public participation—that is to say, an efflorescence of
energy democracy in the access-to-process mode.315 But postreform, the
commission will be relegated to a position of approving or disapproving
particular utility models for earning revenue from system dispatch design.316
Utilities themselves will be elevated to the position of controlling quantities
and types of distributed energy supplies and balancing these with wholesale
312. See N.Y. Feb. 2015 Order, supra note 114, at 31.
313. See N.Y. May 2016 Order, supra note 57, at 41.
314. It has certainly made this one of its goals. See N.Y. Feb. 2015 Order, supra note 114,
at 3.
315. See Matter Master: 14-00581/14-M-0101, supra note 295 (noting 310 intervenors in
the REV proceeding).
316. See N.Y. May 2016 Order, supra note 57, at 24–25, 47 (describing the commission’s
new process for utilities proposing “platform service revenues” and “earning adjustment
mechanisms” to be approved by the commission for inclusion in the utility’s tariff).
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market purchases, so long as they play by the rules set forth for their newly
created markets.
Accordingly, New York’s commission is in essence accepting diminished
control over the future shape of the grid in order to create an efficient en-
ergy market that includes robust consumer-choice-style participation.317 In
making these reforms, the commission has transformed its role from active
policymaker and grid planner into something more akin to a market moni-
tor, in charge of ensuring that utilities have fair market rules and compensa-
tion structures in place.318 That’s an important role, to be sure—the
incentives that the commission puts in place will certainly drive utility deci-
sionmaking regarding what type, scale, and quantity of resources to pursue.
But the commission’s role will also become more opaque, creating risks
to the kind of deliberative democracy it has been so successful in fostering
during its recent regulatory reforms. Although the rate incentives that the
commission establishes will contain significant value choices within them,
these values will be funneled into highly technocratic discussions that mirror
the ratemaking procedures of the past. In these conversations, stakeholders
without significant technical training may find it difficult to link proposed
“earning adjustment mechanisms” to robust debates over the role of the
utility in modern society or the best way to protect vulnerable consumers.319
And because the commission has decided to continue ratemaking’s utility-
by-utility approach to designing new “earning mechanisms” and “platform
service revenues,”320 it will be even more difficult for stakeholders with lim-
ited resources to participate effectively. Thus, it is hard to imagine these
proceedings encouraging civic participation in the way that major planning
or rulemaking proceedings do. Accordingly, New York risks trading away
access to process in enhancing consumer choice.
“So what?” one might ask. If we have more individuals participating in
consumer choice than we could ever hope to muster under an access-to-
process vision, then we may well have a net democratic gain. Maybe con-
sumer participation is all we can really expect of people desensitized by a
century of consumptive turns in democracy, where we have increasingly
been asked to “vote” as consumers and where political campaigns have
largely drawn from the playbook of advertising.321
317. See id. at 16–17, 21–22 (“Rather than specifying or pre-approving all of the actions it
believes need to be taken, the Commission will allow markets to bring forward the best op-
tions to achieve the broad policy objectives identified by the State.”).
318. See N.Y. Feb. 2015 Order, supra note 114, at 31.
319. See N.Y. May 2016 Order, supra note 57.
320. See id. at 36–37 (“To the extent possible, the financial details of EAMs [earning ad-
justment mechanisms] should be developed in rate proceedings, because the relative weight of
each EAM will vary by utility based on its potential value within the service territory, the
capabilities of the utility, and the unique financial situation of each utility.”).
321. See Cohen, supra note 146, at 332 (discussing political campaigns borrowing from
advertising); see also Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Govern-
ance, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 2109, 2114 (2005) (concluding that conscientious consumerism may
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Yet something will be lost in the expediency of implementing consumer
choice. Here’s the key limit of this vision: we, as people, may not seek the
same things under consumer choice as we would if we engaged in access to
process, for two reasons. First, it has long been observed that “the same
person may have distinct interests in her role as consumer from those in her
role as worker, or as citizen, or as a parent.”322 In exercising my consumer
choice, I may view the world and my role within it differently than I do
when I, say, vote, or go to a public meeting.323 Moreover, asking me to ap-
proach decisions about energy supply as a consumer, rather than a citizen
may in fact diminish my willingness to make what I see as socially beneficial,
rather than financially sound, decisions. Electricity-sector researchers al-
ready have found this trend at work, observing:
Millennials are frequently motivated by the social aspects of making better
choices about energy use, and more broadly about sustainability. Once
money is introduced into the equation, the desired behavior is often
“crowded out” by the financial incentive and trails off, as they try to inter-
nally reconcile their motivations for taking action.324
Second, democratic theorists from Rousseau onward have emphasized
the particular importance of deliberation in shaping the choices made in a
democracy.325 That is to say, consumer choice not only narrows the band of
interests I may consider in making energy decisions, it also takes away the
prove a more significant endeavor than trying to confront head-on the challenges that sus-
tainability presents to markets). See generally Cohen, supra note 146 (discussing the various
democratic valences of “consumers” over the twentieth century).
322. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 49, at 2176; accord Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and
Environmental Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1393, 1394 (1981) (arguing that people hold separate
economic and public interest preferences, and economists’ techniques problematically con-
found these categories). But see Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations
of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name Is Preference, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1631,
1635–36 (1989) (reviewing Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law,
and the Environment (1988)) (suggesting Sagoff’s “category mistake” is illusory).
323. See Barber, supra note 154, at 128; Reich, supra note 284, at 1625; Sunstein, supra
note 49, at 31. This long-held intuition of democratic theorists has been empirically confirmed
by behavioral economists, who find that the context in which information is presented to
individuals has dramatic impact on their ultimate choices. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler &
Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness
1–4 (Penguin Books 2009) (2008).
324. David Roberts, Energy-Efficient Homes: Yes, We Want Them. But We Haven’t Done the
Work., Vox (June 22, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/22/11993840/home-energy-manage-
ment [https://perma.cc/H6B9-N3DR] (quoting interview with consumer scientist Guy
Champniss); see also Simon Hedlin & Cass R. Sunstein, Does Active Choosing Promote Green
Energy Use?, 43 Ecology L.Q. 107, 107 (2016) (finding that “active choosing had larger effects
in promoting green energy use than did green energy defaults . . . apparently because of the
interaction between people’s feelings of guilt and reactance”).
325. Ju¨rgen Habermas, The Public Sphere, in Ju¨rgen Habermas on Society and
Politics: A Reader 231, 231–32 (Steven Seidman ed., 1989) (“[P]ublic opinion, in terms of
its very idea, can be formed only if a public that engages in rational discussion exists.”); Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 90–93 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books
1968) (1893).
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opportunity available in an access-to-process mode of democracy for the
process itself to change my mind.326 Thus, if we transfer planning and over-
sight functions from governing institutions to a marketplace of consumer
choice, we diminish the spaces in which citizens and regulators can have
productive interactions that in fact work to change substantive outcomes.327
A loss of deliberative potential may prove particularly worrisome in the elec-
tricity governance context, where hard-to-weigh tradeoffs are now inevitable
among cost, reliability, and security. Significant risks—whether from cli-
mate change, nuclear proliferation, underground storage of various sub-
stances, bird deaths, water shortages, increased energy poverty, or
geopolitical instability, to name a few—are now unavoidable. The question
is which risks we as a society wish to assume, and which we prefer to avoid
at all costs. These are precisely the kinds of questions that cannot be easily
built into a system of market incentives, but beg democratic answers arrived
at through careful consideration of the tradeoffs at hand.
These conclusions about the risks of consumer choice point to some
ways in which regulators might seek to ameliorate the vision’s democratic
weaknesses, even while harnessing its economic strengths. In particular, reg-
ulators should think carefully about how to design the regulatory processes
of establishing new incentive regulation. These processes should make the
value choices inherent in these regulations as obvious and nontechnical as
possible. Beginning such proceedings with broad discussion of values and
their relationship to policy choices, and then transparently translating these
into incentives, would maximize stakeholder input into this more technical
mode of commission policymaking. In this way, maybe the models of con-
sumer choice and access to process could be pursued simultaneously with-
out one working to the diminishment of the other.
B. Local Control and Access to Process
Quite a different set of risks exists with pursuit of local control as a
replacement for more centralized energy decisionmaking. In ideal theory,
robust local democratic processes prove a training ground of civic educa-
tion, giving citizens bite-sized experiences of democracy that ready and ex-
cite them for participation at the national scale.328 One might hope that
326. See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 49, at 2178 (arguing that true “individual rational-
ity” within a democracy “cannot be realized simply through private reflection on one’s per-
sonal preferences; it emerges from social and political struggles”); see also Joseph William
Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 103, 119, 122 (2002);
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 7 (1983) (on the meaning-making functions of collective practices for making
decisions).
327. On the power of deliberation to change minds specifically with respect to energy
policy, see Fishkin et al., supra note 92, at 662–63. See also Daniel C. Esty, Environmental
Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 170 (2004) (“[T]here is a growing
scholarly literature that connects good environmental results with the strength of a jurisdic-
tion’s democratic institutions and the robustness of public debate.”).
328. Cf. Pateman, supra note 219, at 42–43.
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these same ideals would translate to the marriage of a local-control vision of
energy democracy with access to process. If localities were to focus their
reforms on ensuring widespread participation in decisions made under local
ownership or control, perhaps they could become a democratic training
ground for broader participation in energy institutions at the state and fed-
eral levels.329
But there are kinks in this theory when it comes to the energy system.
One significant risk is that participation in energy governance may be a
zero-sum game: individuals that participate in local energy decisionmaking
may decide to forgo state-level or regional-level participation. This decision
might, on its surface, appear logical: to the extent that a locality takes over
ownership of its grid and energy supply decisionmaking, it intentionally sev-
ers itself from state governing institutions.330 This disengagement is likely to
discourage participation in energy institutions at higher levels, given that
local citizens will perceive these to have limited bearing on local resource
decisions.331
But in fact—ironically and problematically—no disengagement hap-
pens at all under local electricity ownership and control. Unless a city physi-
cally islands itself from the rest of the electricity grid, or adopts enough
storage never to call on resources outside its territory,332 areas under local
control remain very much tied to the surrounding grid.333 This interconnec-
tion creates a potential collision between localism and access-to-process vi-
sions, at least for those cities that hope to affect system-wide changes in our
energy supply through the power that local control brings.
For example, say a locality moves to local control in order to drastically
increase its usage of renewable energy. Perhaps, to demonstrate its ambition,
it signs contracts to ensure that 100% of its electricity needs are met by
329. In contrast, the more that localism embraces a consumer-choice model, the less
chance there is of localism functioning in this “training ground” capacity.
330. In other words, the locality “exits” from state-level utility politics and policies. See
Hirschman, supra note 148, at 4, 15–16.
331. Cf. Daley & Reames, supra note 284, at 147 (“While devolution to subnational gov-
ernments may provide more opportunity for public participation in state and local institu-
tions, it significantly complicates the ability of federal agencies to maintain well-resourced
public participation processes.” (citation omitted)).
332. Any “islanding” would be likely to increase everyone’s cost of transitioning to renew-
ables. A larger transmission grid, with more inter-regional flows of electricity, is important in
affordably integrating large amounts of renewable energy into the grid. See Energy & Envtl.
Econ., Regional Coordination in the West: Benefits of PacifiCorp and California
ISO Integration 2–3 (2015), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/StudyBenefits-PacifiCorp-
ISOIntegration.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV9C-F6T7]; Nat. Res. Def. Council, Regional
Transmission Organizations: Recommendations for the West 1 (2016), https://www.
nrdc.org/sites/default/files/regional-transmission-organizations-west-ib.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VYK2-DAG5].
333. See Mass. Inst. of Tech., The Future of the Electric Grid 3 (2011), https://
energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/MITEI-The-Future-of-the-Electric-Grid.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NNS8-BPPD] (describing how the U.S. electric power system is comprised
of three large grids).
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renewable sources.334 Two consequences follow, based on the current struc-
ture of the grid. First, a city may have a false sense that it has created a small-
scale demonstration of perfected decarbonization, when in fact nothing of
the sort has happened. There are no cities with “100% renewable” pledges
that actually source all of their electricity from real-time, local renewable
generation.335 Instead, they are able to import electricity from other loca-
tions via the expansive U.S. transmission grid.336 Moreover, the existence of
“renewable energy certificates” (RECs) allows these cities to continue to run
on fossil fuels as backup power.337 Renewable energy generators earn
RECs—credits created by state law—for each megawatt-hour of renewable
energy they generate, which can then be sold separately from the underlying
energy produced.338 Because of RECs, a city can rely on natural gas or coal-
fired generation to supply, say, a few megawatt-hours of electricity during a
still, sultry evening, and then buy RECs from a local wind farm to “cover”
those megawatt-hours, thus maintaining a 100% renewables pledge.339 There
is nothing necessarily deceptive in this practice, but it does mean that cities
rely upon their neighbors in meeting these pledges more than the populace
may appreciate.340
334. A few cities have done this. See City of Greensburg, Kan. & BNIM, Greensburg
Sustainable Comprehensive Plan 76 (2008), http://www.greensburgks.org/residents/recov
ery-planning/sustainable-comprehensive-master-plan/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/7V
SW-GCWB]; Philip Radford & Sandy Buchanan, Cincinnati Dumps Duke Energy, Huffington
Post (Apr. 28, 2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-radford/cincinnati-
clean-energy_b_1457224.html [https://perma.cc/MHP4-GKVT]; Wilson Ring, 100% of Power
for Vermont City Now Renewable, Bos. Globe (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2014/09/14/vermont-milestone-green-energy-efforts/fsLHJl4eoqv6QoFNewRYBK/story.
html (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Erica Robbie, Aspen Is Third U.S. City to Reach
100% Renewable Energy, Aspen Times (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.aspentimes.com/news/17
972193-113/aspen-is-third-us-city-to-reach-100 [https://perma.cc/2TQY-X8VQ].
335. David Roberts, No, City Pledges to Get 100% Renewable Energy Are Not Misleading,
Vox (Aug. 8, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/8/8/161116
30/city-pledges-100-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/2CN8-5WBD]. Although, Burlington
“theoretically” could island itself from the grid, given that it owns its local grid and hydro-
electric and biomass facilities that could back up its renewable energy. See Colin Woodard,
America’s First All-Renewable-Energy City, Politico Mag. (Nov. 2016), http://www.politi
co.com/magazine/story/2016/11/burlington-what-works-green-energy-214463 [https://perma.
cc/2YZD-V2DZ].
336. Roberts, supra note 335.
337. Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, https://
www.epa.gov/greenpower/renewable-energy-certificates-recs [https://perma.cc/3HEQ-TEEM].
338. Renewable Energy Certificates, Bottom Line (World Res. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov.
2008, at 1, 1–2, http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/bottom_line_renewable_energy_
certs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F9Y-NQTD].
339. See David Roberts, RECs, Which Put the “Green” in Green Electricity, Explained, Vox
(Nov. 9, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/11/9/9696820/renewable-energy-certifi
cates [https://perma.cc/5QVB-9FY5].
340. See, e.g., Michael Bielawski, Vermont’s All-Renewable Claims Based on Uneven RECs
Market, VermontWatchdog.org (Nov. 28, 2016), http://watchdog.org/282645/renewable-en
ergy-credits-created-equal/ [https://perma.cc/H9YM-WRYS] (discussing this challenge in rela-
tion to Burlington’s claim of “100 percent renewable” energy); see also Alex Epstein, The Truth
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The second consequence of local renewable commitments under current
grid conditions is potentially more pernicious. Assume a locality that moves
to a 100% renewables pledge replaces its old contracts to purchase coal-fired
electricity with contracts to purchase wind farm output. Or even assume
that it builds a community-owned solar farm to replace the coal it used to
rely upon. Because the electricity grid is interconnected,341 the coal-fired
electricity that used to go to this locality can now be routed to another loca-
tion with less stringent renewable energy requirements. The fallout is that a
city’s actions directed toward changing its personal energy mix may have
limited impact on the composition of the larger grid.342
Note that this same tension does not inhere in all local actions related to
climate change. For example, if a city changes zoning, land use, and trans-
portation infrastructure to induce less driving and denser living, these
changes will both satisfy local democratic preferences343 and reduce overall
carbon pollution. The same is true of changes to a city’s building code to
improve the efficiency of its building stock. 344 But importing more renewa-
ble energy connects a city to actions outside its physical footprint in a way
that these localized changes do not.
Because of this interconnectedness, energy localism may result in a sort
of false empowerment, with residents believing they have substantially con-
tributed to solving a problem that in fact cannot be addressed through their
actions at the local level. Where this happens, localism proves at best a lim-
ited antidote to frustrations with large-scale energy bureaucracy. At worst, a
robust local approach to energy democracy risks diminishing the impetus to
engage in bureaucratic processes and reforms at the state, regional, and fed-
eral level—the levels of governance where citizens might be more likely to
accomplish their most ambitious aims with respect to energy systems’
transformation.345
About Apple’s ‘100% Renewable’ Energy Usage, Forbes (Jan. 8, 2016, 12:23 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/alexepstein/2016/01/08/the-truth-about-apples-100-renewable-energy-
usage/#1785ea1c3256 [https://perma.cc/D422-KY63].
341. Mass. Inst. of Tech., supra note 333, at 3.
342. Policy wonks often refer to this troubling consequence of local carbon pollution reg-
ulation as “leakage.” See Shelley Welton et al., Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Colum-
bia Law Sch., Regulating Electricity Imports into RGGI: Toward a Legal, Workable
Solution 7 (2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/
files/Publications/Fellows/RGGI%20paper_Final%20Aug%2021_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M3XM-VK7E].
343. At least, such actions might satisfy democratic preferences if the local democracy is
robust.
344. See Trisolini, supra note 37, at 688–89, 697, 707 (arguing that “because local actions
predominantly target consumption, the built environment, and waste generation,” they create
net cuts in carbon pollution).
345. Of course, state-level action runs into similar challenges (as does federal, to a certain
extent, when it comes to the global problem of climate change). But states have more tools to
control the emissions content of electricity that crosses their borders. California’s “first deliv-
erer” policy essentially imposes a carbon imports tax on electricity. Cal. Code  Regs. tit. 17,
§ 95802(a)(175) (2017). For an explanation of how California’s “first deliverer” policy works
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In offering this critique, I do not wish to tamp out local efforts at energy
control and supply altogether. Local control—in certain locales, with demo-
cratically responsive local governments and appetites for experimentation—
might result in useful tests of new modes of participation and ownership.346
Localism might also prove particularly useful in promoting certain resources
in earlier stages of development, where early investment can help bring
down costs and make them more competitive in larger marketplaces.347 By
placing their energies here, localities could provide useful information for
broader efforts to accomplish their same goals.348
But as an overall principle of energy democracy, touting localism as a
solution obscures the fact that we can’t run from our interwired nature, at
least not for some time to come. Any useful lessons learned from local ex-
perimentation will have to be transferred upwards to state and federal efforts
at electricity infrastructure transformation, if they are to have the kinds of
practical effects their proponents desire. To lessen the possibility that local-
ism functions as a smokescreen rather than a locus of innovation, localities
taking over their own energy decisionmaking will thus have to ensure that
they—and their residents—remain engaged at levels of governance beyond
the city bounds.
Conclusion
The possibility of more democratic futures . . . depends on the political tools
with which we address the passing of the era of fossil fuel.349
in practice, see Erin Parlar et al., Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law Sch.,
Legal Issues in Regulating Imports in State and Regional Cap and Trade Program 11
(2012), http://wordpress.ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-law/files/2016/06/Parlar-et-al.-2012-
10-Imports-in-StateRegional-Cap-and-Trade.pdf [https://perma.cc/23FD-GPMS]. See also
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding Califor-
nia’s low-carbon fuel standard, which regulates the carbon content of imported as well as in-
state fuels).
346. See Welton, supra note 37, at 342–43.
347. Cf. Herman K. Trabish, Why the Installed Price of Distributed Solar Keeps Dropping,
Utility Dive (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-the-installed-price-of-
distributed-solar-keeps-dropping/405187/ [https://perma.cc/MH3R-8SXQ] (suggesting that
distributed solar costs plummeted over the last few years largely due to a decrease in “soft
costs” as companies learned about how to efficiently and effectively market and install panels).
348. See Welton, supra note 37, at 341–42 (concluding that “[m]unicipalization and CCA
thus offer the most promise as essentially a prod, both to more robust state action on climate
change and to higher-level conversations about the possibilities for, and shape of, decarboniza-
tion.”); cf. Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 Yale L.J. 480, 483, 485 (2008)
(explaining that “innovative high-risk policies” are best implemented in contexts where policy
can be easily reversed, and that the pursuit of such policies is preferable to a simple utilitarian
welfare-maximization model in the case where learning is possible).
349. Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil
252 (2011).
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This Article has suggested that the pressures placed upon energy law to
turn in more democratic directions present more contradictions and chal-
lenges than first meet the eye. Even if energy law reformers agree on a goal
of democratization, there remain significant choices to be made regarding
how to democratize. This Article has illustrated the critical structural choices
to be made regarding how to shape the frameworks in which debates over
the future of our energy system will take place. These choices will tap into
citizens’ and energy consumers’ knowledge, preferences, and deliberative ca-
pacities in distinctly different manners, and none is without drawbacks in
some respects. For these reasons, it is critical that regulators and advocates
considering democratization understand the tradeoffs to be made in pro-
ceeding down a consumer-choice, local-control, or access-to-process line of
reform. A simple vaunting of certain reforms’ “democratic” characteristics
risks short-circuiting this important analysis.
There remains a risk that all this talk of pathways to energy democracy
might seem rather small-fry to readers outside the energy law field, who
doubt their personal or society’s general inclination to participate in any
sort of energy democracy. To thwart any reasoning in this direction, I want
to end with a reminder of just how tightly linked energy and democracy may
be. In Carbon Democracy, one of the most ambitious scholarly attempts to
link the two topics, political theorist and historian Timothy Mitchell sweep-
ingly surveys the bonds between society’s dominant fuel choice and the
character of its democracy.350 In brief, he argues that the geological charac-
teristics of oil—and the nature of its supply chain—had much to do with
the forms of democracy that came to dominate the industrialized world dur-
ing the twentieth century.351 Oil extraction was technocratic, dominated by
managers and engineers, and its global distribution pathways were flexi-
ble.352 This structure kept workers from gaining the same power they had
during the heyday of coal, where the importance of individualized miner
knowledge and the inflexibility of supply chains allowed for greater worker
influence.353
Mitchell’s analysis thus emphasizes how fuel choice influences the dem-
ocratic character of a society. The analysis here focuses on the antecedent
democratic question of how we choose our fuel—a question that becomes
even more important if Mitchell’s analysis is correct.354 As Mitchell has ex-
plained it, “[T]he building of solutions to future energy needs is also the
350. See generally Mitchell, supra note 349 (discussing in-depth the way in which a
nation’s energy source is reflective of and influential to its political development).
351. Id. at 4, 253.
352. Id. at 21–29.
353. Id. at 21 (“The flow and concentration of [coal] energy made it possible to connect
the demands of miners to those of others, and to give their arguments a technical force that
could not easily be ignored.”).
354. Some criticize Mitchell’s analysis as overly materialist, focusing on the importance of
energy infrastructure to the exclusion of social relations, but not in ways that undermine his
point for present purposes. See Mazen Labban, Book Review—Timothy Mitchell’s ‘Carbon De-
mocracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil’, Antipode (Mar. 19, 2013), https://antipodefounda
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building of new forms of collective life.”355 When we decide how to power
our society, we are also making decisions about ownership structures, politi-
cal power, transportation networks, landscapes, and the risks we are will-
ing—and unwilling—to accept as byproducts of a life of modern
convenience.356 At a more quotidian level, we are deciding how our houses
should be designed, how we will commute, where we will live, and how we
will interact with technology. Because of these inescapable interconnections
and dependencies, the pathways we choose for democratizing energy will
ultimately help shape our country’s character for decades, if not centuries,
to come. Let us choose them wisely, with as deep an understanding of their
possibilities and pitfalls as we can muster.
tion.org/2013/03/19/book-review-mazen-labban-on-timothy-mitchells-carbon-democracy/
[https://perma.cc/WB3U-GYR6] (suggesting Mitchell problematically ignores “other kinds of
linkages . . . [that helped] forg[e] collective political ideology, such as mass circulation newspa-
pers and other periodicals, political parties and organizations, etc.”).
355. Mitchell, supra note 349, at 238.
356. See Clark A. Miller & Jennifer Richter, Social Planning for Energy Transitions, 1 Cur-
rent Sustainable/Renewable Energy Rep. 77, 78 (2014) (“[T]he rise of new energy re-
sources (or the end of old ones) can give rise to massive reconfiguration of social,
environmental, and technological landscapes . . . .”).
